



UNODC

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

STUDY ON

ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

ASSOCIATED WITH SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS

AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

FROM GLO.ACT PARTNER COUNTRIES TO EUROPE



The Project is funded
by the European Union

GloACT
ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

UNODC
Research

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Acknowledgements

The present publication was developed by the Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) headed by Ilias Chatzis, under the substantive guidance of Aimée Comrie and Eurídice Márquez, jointly with the Research and Trends Analysis Branch of UNODC, under the responsibility of Angela Me. The research underlying this publication has been developed by Claire Healy, Research Officer of the Research and Analysis Branch with contributions from Jesper Samson, Irmgard Zeiler, and Kelly-Ann Wheelan.

Furthermore, we would like to thank our UNODC colleagues Samantha Irikidzai Munodawafa, Sabrina Knap, Jee Aei Lee, Diana Camerini, Fabrizio Sarrica, Emmanuelle Kunigk, Martin Reeve, Giulia Iovino, Diane Sahakian, Jeremy Milsom, Ali Elbereir, Cristina Albertin, Cesar Guedes Ferreros, Ilir Boci, Ashenafi Gebreegziabher, Shahida Gilani, Ehsan Gillani, Ghulam Haider Nader, Zubaida Shakir, Hussein Alhares, Reginald Pitts, Mona Salem, Nazmun Nahar, Ali Hosny, Chiraz Belhadj Ali, Annkathrin Rest and Chris Chinda.

UNODC is also grateful to the many colleagues from: Frontex, Eurojust, Europol, FINTRAC, Scotia Bank, INTERPOL, the Mixed Migration Centre, the Anti-Financial Crime Alliance; the UN family; the practitioners on the ground in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Iraq and Pakistan as well as their Permanent Missions to the United Nations Office in Vienna for facilitating the contact; members and organizations of the civil society, in particular Naveed Shinwari (CAMP), Suzan Aref and Ahmed Miran; and the 23 migrants and refugees, whose identities have been kept anonymous, who agreed to be consulted for this publication.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union, within the framework of a joint initiative by the European Union and UNODC being implemented in partnership with IOM, the Global Action against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (GLO.ACT). The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union or the United Nations including UNODC or IOM.

Cover image by Yaser Rezahi.

Design and layout by Andrea Socorro Olivares.

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Executive Summary

Illicit financial flows (IFFs) – financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer, or use, that reflect an exchange of value and cross country borders – are major impediments to sustainable development. They divert important resources away from state revenue and public investments, foster impunity, and ultimately erode criminal justice systems as a whole. The harmful effects of illicit financial flows and the need to reduce them are demonstrated by their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as Target 16.4. It stipulates the goal to “significantly reduce illicit financial flows and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Progress towards this target is measured by SDG Indicator 16.4.1 (the “total value of inward and outward IFFs in current US dollars”), for which UNODC is the custodian together with UNCTAD.

Organized crimes vary in their characteristics, objectives, and the extent to which they cross national borders. Consequently, the amount and nature of the IFFs they generate also varies. Given the transnational nature of smuggling of migrants (SOM) and cross-border trafficking in persons (TIP), monitoring and combatting IFFs is crucially important for disrupting, prosecuting, and dismantling the organized criminal networks committing these dangerous crimes.

This Study focuses on the trends, nuances, and complexities surrounding IFFs associated with smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons into the European Union (EU), with specific attention paid to those relating to GLO.ACT partner countries.¹ It is based on an analysis of available data, field research findings, and review of secondary literature.

Smuggling of migrants

For smuggling of migrants, the findings of this Study confirm that the GLO.ACT partner countries are significant countries of origin of smuggled people into Europe. According to Frontex, there were a total of 184,323 attempts at irregular entry into the EU by people from the four GLO.ACT partner countries during the five years between January 2018 and December 2022.² According to Europol and Interpol, more than 90 per cent of irregular entries into the EU are facilitated by smugglers.³ Thus, based on the detection of irregular entry attempts, it can be estimated that nearly 166,000 were smuggling incidents. As both the payment for and the cost of facilitating such smuggling generate IFFs, it follows that smuggling of migrants relating to GLO.ACT partner countries generates considerable IFFs.

The Study has also found that, from 2018 to 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea route had been the route most commonly used by people from GLO.ACT partner countries to irregularly enter the EU.⁴ However, the trend changed in 2022 when the Western Balkans land route became the

1 The “Global Action against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants – Asia and the Middle East” (GLO.ACT) project is a joint initiative by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), being implemented in partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in four countries: Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and Pakistan.

2 Frontex, “Detections of Illegal Border-Crossing Statistics”, FRAN and JORA Databases. Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed on 17 February 2023).

3 Europol and Interpol, “Migrant Smuggling Networks”, Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2016), p. 4.

4 Frontex dataset on Detections of Illegal Border Crossings Statistics, available at https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2023/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_20230302.xlsx (accessed on 6 April 2023).

most popular for people from GLO.ACT partner countries. This is apparent from the interceptions during 2022: there were 31,980 total detections for the Western Balkans land route followed by the Central Mediterranean Route with 15,062 total detections.⁵

The Western Balkans route involves refugees and migrants leaving Türkiye, traveling through Greece or Bulgaria, exiting the EU, and traveling through North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and/or Albania before re-entering the EU via Hungary, Croatia, or Romania.

The Central Mediterranean Route is dominated by Libyan smuggling networks, who charge an average of US\$1,500 - \$1,800 per client to smuggle them from Libya to Italy by boat.⁶ In 2017, the peak year for arrivals on this route, organized criminal groups running smuggling operations along this route were estimated to have earned a gross income of \$150 million. However, this income decreased to just over €24 million in 2018, and to €12 million in 2019.⁷

Trafficking in persons

For trafficking in persons, the type of trafficking actors, forms of exploitation and victim profiles heavily influence the size, modalities, and directions of IFFs. The most profit tends to be made in the exploitation phase, as the flow of revenue is continuous rather than one-off. Trafficking for forced labour and sexual exploitation are the most common forms of exploitation and provide for repeated profits from continued exploitation.

For IFFs associated with trafficking in persons, an important distinction can be made between domestic trafficking and cross-border trafficking. Domestic trafficking is less likely to generate IFFs – which are cross-border in nature – unless the perpetrator, the victim or other actors involved have their centre of economic interest outside the country.

The UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022 indicates that an overwhelming majority (99 per cent) of detected victims of trafficking in South Asia⁸ are domestically trafficked. However, the data also indicates an increase in the number of detected South Asian victims identified in other regions of the world. In fact, the trafficking victims from GLO.ACT partner countries are among the most commonly detected nationalities from outside the region in Western and Southern Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, Türkiye and Italy.⁹ It can thus be assumed that IFFs associated with cross-border trafficking in persons from the GLO.ACT partner countries have been increasing in the recent years. Furthermore, as UNODC Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons records only the administrative data on cases identified by the authorities in the respective countries, it is likely that a significant proportion of trafficking cases and attendant IFFs go undetected.

In the case of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons from GLO.ACT partner countries, IFFs are generated through cash payments, value transfers using the hawala system, and to a lesser extent, money transfer service providers. This poses challenges in responding to IFFs related to

5 Frontex, "Migratory Map". Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed on 15 February 2023).

6 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "West Africa, North Africa and the Central Mediterranean", Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants (2021). Available at www.unodc.org/res/som/; Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2020" (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

7 Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2020" (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

8 Including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

9 Based on official national data from 21 countries reported to UNODC for the "Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons 2018 and 2020".

smuggling and trafficking, as the majority of cases involve payment and transfer methods that are not easily traceable.

The illicit income made by smugglers and traffickers are largely spent in three ways: (a) sent back to the country of origin, often invested in legal businesses such as restaurants, bars, or real estate; (b) used to support a lavish lifestyle, generating IFFs related to consumer goods; and (c) invested in other criminal or legitimate activities in the destination country. All such uses may generate IFFs.

Not only do the crimes of migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons seriously endanger the lives, safety and well-being of the individuals being smuggled or trafficked, but they also generate significant sums of illicit financial flows. This ultimately undermines state institutions, promotes impunity, and further bolsters the means of criminals involved. An enhanced understanding and investigation of illicit financial flows is a crucial step towards more effective disruption, prosecution and dismantling of migrant smuggling and trafficking networks.

Key Findings and Recommendations

Illicit Financial Flows associated with Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons

Key Finding 1

People leaving their countries due to conflict, persecution, or other circumstances include those who use the services of smugglers, or those who fall prey to trafficking in persons. Both scenarios have an impact on illicit financial flows.

Policy Recommendation

Efforts to address illicit financial flows should not compromise the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and those who are driven to leave their countries due to other circumstances that threaten their fundamental human rights. National responses to illicit financial flows arising from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants must adopt a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach, in full respect of the range of rights that are guaranteed under international law.

Key Finding 2

The crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons generate considerable IFFs. This impacts not only the countries directly affected by smuggling or trafficking (countries of origin, transit and destination), but also third countries affected by IFFs due to related payments, costs, and income, as well as the transfer and management of crime proceeds. This Study has demonstrated that it is the highly organized criminal groups, rather than individuals and loosely connected, flexible criminal networks, that make the most financial gains from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants and generate illicit financial flows on a transnational scale.

Policy Recommendation

International cooperation efforts must include cooperation between partner countries, transit, and destination countries, and relevant third countries. As this Study shows, organizers of smuggling operations may be based in third countries, rather than in origin, transit or destination countries, which in some cases can be far away from the smuggling routes. Thus, investigations of IFFs flowing into and out of origin, transit, destination and third countries need to be undertaken proactively. For this to happen, international cooperation between origin, transit, destination, and third countries, including through joint or parallel financial investigations, needs to be fostered. Cooperation must also be multi-sectoral in nature, involving law enforcement agencies, financial investigation entities, other criminal justice agencies, and private sector actors, who are crucial in tracking suspicious transactions. As discussed in the Study, there is potentially a lot of diffusion of earnings from organizers in third countries to their members on the ground in origin, transit, and destination countries. Increased cooperation with third countries in a multi-sectoral way is key in tracing these transactions.

Key Finding 3

While smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are distinct crimes, they are closely linked in practice as they often occur along the same routes, use the same methods of transportation, and in some cases, are perpetrated by the same individuals or groups. Thus, some IFFs may relate to perpetrators involved in both trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

Policy Recommendation

There is a need to strengthen the legislative framework required to address illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

National legislation should specifically define and criminalize participation in an organized criminal group. This legislation must also impose tougher penalties for organized crime involvement in trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling should be included as predicate offences under money laundering criminal provisions, and such provisions must enable both seizure of assets used to commit these offences and confiscation of proceeds of the crime.

Fundamentally, in countries where smuggling of migrants is not specifically criminalized, it is essential to do so, by ratifying and domestically implementing the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Key Finding 4

With the advances of the information and communications technology (ICT) around the world, using such technologies in the commission of transnational crimes, including in cross-border trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, has also become more widespread. For example, smugglers sell and send fraudulent travel documents to clients via the Internet and traffickers frequently use online platforms to recruit victims. Cyber-enabled transnational crimes facilitate cross-border value transfers and generate IFFs, including through making additional profits or the transfer, management or laundering of crime proceeds.

Policy Recommendation

There is a need to enhance the criminal justice actors' understanding of how digital tools and services are being used for the facilitation of criminal activities online, including trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. As with any industry, the use of social media and other digital tools and services is now an integral and organic part of criminal activities in the online sphere. There is a wide range of web- and mobile-based tools and services currently being used. These include: platforms for social networks, content sharing and instant communication; digital applications for navigation, encryption, locking and erasing contents on a device; digital services that enable money transfers and money laundering; digital solutions for cryptocurrency transfers; and use of the darkweb.¹⁰ Vigilant intelligence gathering on the developments and trends of such technology in IFFs, including open-source intelligence (OSINT), is an essential measure for the effective investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. Specialized training of relevant criminal justice actors, including on how to detect such online criminal activities and how to collect and preserve electronic evidence, is also crucial.

¹⁰ Frontex and Europol, "Digitalisation of migrant smuggling: Digital tools and apps enabling facilitation" (September 2021), p. 22.

Smuggling of Migrants

Key Finding 5

Illicit financial flows associated with smuggling of migrants arise from the cross-border transfer of:

Payments by refugees and migrants who use smuggling services;

- Expenses for costs borne by smugglers;
 - “Salaries” between different members of a smuggling group; and
 - Crime proceeds issuing from smuggling of migrants, such as through investing or money laundering.
-

Key Finding 6

The volume and directions of IFFs associated with smuggling often depend on the scale at which the smugglers operate. Smuggling of migrants is committed by a wide spectrum of perpetrators, ranging from local, independent, and opportunistic smugglers; small groups collaborating in a business arrangement; to large, structured transnational crime organizations. The high-level organizers of migrant smuggling may be based anywhere – in the countries of origin, transit, or destination of their clients, as well as in other countries.

IFFs relating to the costs of committing the smuggling offences also vary greatly according to routes, origins, destinations, services offered and modes of transportation.

Key Finding 7

Smugglers may operate seemingly legitimate travel and labour recruitment agencies. Thus, financial flows resulting from the smuggling activity can be registered as legal income of legitimate businesses, making the related IFFs even more difficult to detect. If the operation uses a legitimate business as a front, IFFs may be recorded, processed, and transferred together with legal funds.

Policy Recommendation

Organized criminal groups, including those involved in trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, routinely use corporations, businesses, charitable organizations or other legal entities to carry out their crimes. Ensuring that such legal persons cannot be used to shield natural persons from liability, and that their complex structures cannot be used to conceal their illegal activities and its illicit financial flows, is an important component of combatting transnational organized crime. In accordance with Article 10 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), liability of legal persons must be established by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences.

Key Finding 8

The IFFs associated with comprehensive smuggling packages, which facilitates smuggling to more distant destinations in a relatively short time, involve flows of larger sums of money due to the higher prices involved. Smugglers dealing in high-quality fraudulent documents can also charge a significant markup. However, as such packages are inaccessible for many potential clients due to the high cost, this type of smuggling-related IFFs is less common than other types.

In the marketplace form of smuggling, wherein the smuggling services are offered in a competing marketplace-type setup, IFFs involving smaller sums move between refugees' and migrants' countries of origin, smuggling hubs in transit countries, and the centres of economic interest of smugglers.

In many cases, clients of smuggling make relatively small cash payments for individual services to opportunistic actors. As this commonly takes place in transit countries, and the clients usually have their centre of economic interest in the origin countries, these payments constitute IFFs albeit on a very small scale.

Policy Recommendation

Preventive measures (e.g., expanding income generation opportunities) must be scaled up in communities, especially near migrant smuggling hotspots in both origin and transit countries. The emergence of opportunistic smugglers can be attributed to, inter alia, a lack of alternative livelihoods.

Key Finding 9

A total of 184,323 attempts at irregular entries into the EU by people from the four GLO.ACT partner countries were recorded during the five years between January 2018 and December 2022. Around 90 per cent of these attempts are estimated to have been facilitated by smugglers. Thus, based on the detection of irregular entry attempts, it can be estimated that nearly 166,000 were smuggling incidents. The routes on which people from GLO.ACT partner countries have most frequently been identified in recent years are the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean routes.

Policy Recommendation

International cooperation, including by prioritizing the investigation of IFFs, must also be scaled up between origin, transit, and destination countries along the known and frequently used routes, in particular the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean routes. As indicated in the Study, these are the most frequently used routes for smuggling of migrants, and are thus highly lucrative for smugglers. Cooperation should include proactive, intelligence-driven investigations targeting loosely connected and less hierarchical providers of smuggling services that are based in known hubs.

Trafficking in Persons

Key Finding 10

Illicit financial flows associated with trafficking in persons arise from the cross-border transfer of:

Costs and payments of the trafficking act, such as recruitment of trafficking victims and their transportation and accommodation;

- The costs of exercising means of control;
 - The costs of different forms of exploitation;
 - Income from the provision of exploitative services, exploitation of begging and products produced through exploitation;
 - Income from the sale of a person, including forced marriage; and
 - Crime proceeds from trafficking in persons, such as through investing or money laundering.
-

Key Finding 11

The type of trafficking actors, forms of exploitation and victim profiles heavily influence the size, modalities, and directions of illicit financial flows associated with trafficking in persons. For example, traffickers who operate as a cross-border network are more likely to generate illicit financial flows than domestic traffickers.

Policy Recommendation

When investigating cases involving trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, national authorities should be trained in identifying the indicators in the scenarios, modalities and types of actors that are known to generate higher levels of illicit income to better detect and investigate the corresponding illicit financial flows.

Key Finding 12

An important distinction can be made between domestic trafficking and cross-border trafficking in relation to IFFs. Domestic trafficking is less likely to generate IFFs unless the perpetrator, victim or other actors involved (e.g., buyers of sexual services, prospective spouses in the case of forced marriage, or labour intermediaries) have their centre of economic interest outside the country.

The data on detected victims of trafficking in GLO.ACT partner countries would suggest limited inward IFFs associated with trafficking in persons into the partner countries. According to data provided to UNODC by Member States, 99 per cent of all victims of trafficking detected in South Asia,¹¹ were trafficked internally, within their own country of citizenship. However, there are indications of outward IFFs associated with human trafficking from the partner countries. Indeed, an increasing number of victims from South Asian countries were identified in countries in East Asia

¹¹ Including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

and the Pacific, Western and Southern Europe, and North America, during the period 2017-2020. Nevertheless, this data refers only to trafficking cases detected by the authorities, and a large number of cases are likely to remain undetected.

Policy Recommendation

The South Asia subregion convicts fewer perpetrators of trafficking in persons in proportion to its overall population than most other regions. There is thus a need to increase the investigation and prosecution of internal trafficking cases in the region as well as to better identify and protect victims of internal trafficking.

Although internal trafficking is less likely to result in illicit financial flows than cross-border trafficking, action against domestic trafficking is a necessary component to tackling illicit financial flows. Lack of robust national responses to internal trafficking can lead to unchecked proliferation of such crimes and fuel the expansion of organized criminal groups and trafficking networks.

In the case of internal labour trafficking for the production of goods and merchandise sold internationally, it may in fact result in significant illicit financial flows.

Key Finding 13

Higher profits tend to be made in the exploitation phase of trafficking in persons, as the flow of revenue is continuous rather than one-off. Financial transactions include, for example, payments from a customer to the exploiter and profits transferred from the exploiter to other members of the trafficking network. The latter is more likely to constitute IFFs, as the other members may be located in countries other than the country of exploitation.

Policy Recommendation

There is a need to strengthen law enforcement capacity to identify, investigate and prosecute illicit financial flows and the transfers of money behind trafficking in persons. This can be achieved by prioritizing financial investigations, strengthening anti-money laundering provisions and enabling the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of the crime as well as asset recovery mechanisms. Financial investigations are an essential component of the fight against trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling as they provide evidence of the offence, deprive the trafficker or smuggler of his/her financial motivation, and allow direct and indirect compensation for victims. According to available statistics, seizures and confiscation of assets are low despite the UNTOC provisions stipulating that proceeds of crime or property must be confiscated and can be used to compensate the victims.

Key Finding 14

Trafficking for forced labour and sexual exploitation are the most common forms of trafficking and provide for repeated profits from continued exploitation.

Policy Recommendation

Special attention, especially from a gender perspective, must be given to strengthening the understanding of and responses to illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation and labour exploitation. The gendered nature of trafficking in persons is evident through data collection. The UNODC Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons, which have collected and analysed global trafficking data since 2003, have consistently found that women and girls make up the majority of detected victims. An analysis of court cases shows that female victims are subjected to physical or extreme violence at the hands of their traffickers at a rate three times higher than males.¹² Furthermore, income from labour exploitation, and therefore also illicit financial flows, is often shrouded in legitimacy. There is a need for more research and investigation to be able to quantify these flows and devise appropriate responses in the partner countries.

Value Transfer Systems and Illicit Income

Key Finding 15

High-level organizers of smuggling and trafficking may be based anywhere – in the countries of origin, transit, or destination of their clients, or in other countries. They may manage the illicit income, costs, and proceeds remotely, through wire or banking institution transfers, informal money transfer systems or delivery by cash courier.

Policy Recommendation

During the data collection process for the Study, it was clear that investigations of trafficking cases generally do not include financial investigations in practice. Yet, this is the crucial kind of evidence that would improve the quality of investigations. It ensures the apprehension of not just the low-level actors, but also the organizers who make the most profit out of the offence. Countries should:

- Provide specialized training for relevant actors (e.g., police, investigators, prosecutors, judges) on illicit financial flows;
- Adapt legislation to establish or strengthen asset management and recovery agency, compensation funds, and databases and coordination among such units through action plans, strategies, and standard operating procedures;
- Improve international cooperation through parallel or joint investigations and joint asset recovery mechanisms to confiscate proceeds and assets; and
- Strengthen cooperation with the private sector.

Key Finding 16

In the case of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons from GLO.ACT partner countries, IFFs consist of value transfers using cash, the hawala system, and, to a lesser extent, money transfer service providers. This poses challenges for the response to IFFs related to smuggling and trafficking, as the majority of cases involve payment and transfer methods that are not so easily traceable.

¹² UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022 (United Nations publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1), p. 18.

Policy Recommendation

Effective monitoring and investigative mechanisms must be put in place to identify, monitor, and take action against the criminal abuse of hawala and other cash-based traditional value transfer systems. In particular, criminal justice institutions must strengthen their understanding and expertise in addressing the way in which the abovementioned value transfer systems move illicit gains from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. However, any measures taken should not penalize the legitimate use of these systems, particularly as hawala is an established way of doing business in many partner countries.

Key Finding 17

Smugglers and traffickers use criminal proceeds in three ways: (i) sent back to the country of origin, often invested in legal businesses such as restaurants and bars, or real estate; (ii) used to support a lavish lifestyle, generating IFFs related to consumer goods; or (iii) invested in other criminal or legitimate activities in the destination country. Each of these ways may generate IFFs and often involve some form of money laundering.

Policy Recommendation

There is a need for closer cooperation between governments and the private sector, especially value transfer service providers, to track illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. This may entail enactment of an enabling legal provision or establishment of a framework for such cooperation, and/or in practice, designation of focal points to facilitate mutual sharing of information. Money service businesses and social media platforms have an important role to play in detecting and tracking illicit financial flows. Awareness raising initiatives and training for the private and public sector stakeholders should also take place, including on the financial disruption, transnational cash-courier networks, open-source intelligence (OSINT) and red flag indicators of trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This Study combines data analysis and field research findings with available literature to provide evidence on different aspects of illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP). The Study has been carried out under the “Global Action against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants – Asia and the Middle East” (GLO.ACT) project – a joint initiative by the European Union (EU) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), being implemented in partnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in four countries: Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.¹³

The Study begins with a dedicated chapter on IFFs associated with migrant smuggling to set the context for the SOM in GLO.ACT partner countries and describes the various actors involved, as well as the different forms of smuggling payments. It then examines types of IFFs related to smuggling income and smuggling costs.

This is followed by a dedicated chapter on IFFs associated with TIP which similarly sets the context for TIP in GLO.ACT partner countries and describes the actors involved. A key distinction is made between international and domestic trafficking, due to the implications for associated IFFs. The chapter then examines the different types of IFFs related to trafficking income and trafficking costs, with a particular focus on income from exploitation.

Systems of value transfer and IFFs related to crime proceeds issuing from SOM and TIP are considered

in Chapters 4 and 5 of this Study, respectively. The Study concludes with evidence-based policy recommendations drawn from its findings.

1.1. Illicit Financial Flows, Smuggling of Migrants, and Trafficking in Persons

Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) refers to “financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use, that reflect an exchange of value and that cross-country borders”.¹⁴ Through the inclusion of Target 16.4 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the international community has agreed to collectively work towards “significantly reduc[ing] illicit financial flows”, which is to be measured by indicator 16.4.1 (total value of inward and outward IFFs in current United States dollars).¹⁵ The custodian agencies of SDG indicator 16.4.1, namely UNODC and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), worked jointly to develop a statistical measurement framework and methodology for this indicator: Conceptual Framework for the Statistical Measurement of Illicit Financial Flows.¹⁶

Smuggling of Migrants is defined in the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (SOM Protocol).¹⁷ The SOM Protocol also criminalizes enabling irregular stay and document fraud offences, provided that they are committed with the purpose of smuggling of migrants and for a financial or other material benefit.¹⁸ Throughout this Study, the specific smuggling offence refers to facilitating illegal entry, and the related offences are referred to as enabling irregular stay

13 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Overview: Global Action against Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants - Asia and the Middle East (GLO.ACT Asia and the Middle East)”. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/glo-act2/overview.html. GLO.ACT Asia and the Middle East aims to assist governmental authorities and civil society organizations in targeted innovative and demand-driven interventions: sustaining effective strategy and policy development, legislative review and harmonization, capability development and regional and trans-regional cooperation in order to strengthen identification referral and protection mechanisms for victims of trafficking in persons and vulnerable migrants. While this study presents an analysis of GLO.ACT Partner Countries, examples from Syria and other neighbouring countries have also been used.

14 UNODC and UNCTAD, “Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows”. Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/IFF_Conceptual_Framework_EN.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2023).

15 A/RES/70/1, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

16 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs)”, UNODC Research. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/iff.html (accessed on 11 April 2023).

17 Smuggling of migrants is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.”

18 Art.3, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2241, p. 507; Doc. A/55/383.

and document fraud. All three fall under the overall offence of SOM and thus this Study addresses IFFs associated with all three types of smuggling offences.





When safe and legal migration is not possible, nor accessible, many people seeking to flee conflict, persecution or other challenges use the services of smugglers to facilitate their journey. Smugglers charge various amounts for their services, depending on factors such as distance, routes, and the risk of detection.¹⁹ Smuggling may involve large, complex multinational crime organizations, with sophisticated financial structures that use international banking systems to transfer and launder money. However, it can also involve smugglers who work independently in return for cash payments from refugees and migrants.²⁰ Smugglers operating in and from GLO.ACT partner

countries are located somewhere along this spectrum from sophisticated multinational crime organizations to independent, opportunistic actors.

As IFFs, by definition, arise from the cross-border financial transaction emerging from criminal or other illicit activities, the IFFs associated with SOM arise from the cross-border transfer of:

- Payments by refugees and migrants who use smuggling services;
- Expenses for costs borne by smugglers;
- “Salaries” between different members of a smuggling group;
- Crime proceeds issuing from smuggling of migrants, such as through investing or money laundering.

Fig. 1 Examples of typical IFFs in the context of SOM by type of actors involved

Direction of Value Transfer	Illicit Financial Flow
Client to Smuggler 	Payment by client resident ²¹ in their country of origin or transit to smuggler resident anywhere outside that country Payment made on behalf of client by third party, resident in any country, to smuggler resident in any other country
Smuggler to Smuggler 	Value transferred as salary by smuggler resident in a country to accomplice resident in any other country, in form of a salary or as reimbursement for costs incurred
Smuggler to Official 	Value transferred as bribe to facilitate smuggling by smuggler resident in one country to an official who is resident in another country
Smuggling proceeds 	Transfer of proceeds of smuggling from one country to another Money laundering of smuggling proceeds between two or more countries

19 UNODC, “Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018” (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

20 Ibid.



21 The use of the term “resident” throughout refers to the country where the person in question has their centre of economic interest. See: United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, “Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs)”, UNODC Research. Available at www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/iff.html (accessed on 11 April 2023).

Trafficking in Persons is defined in the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (TIP Protocol).²² As is the case with SOM, different typologies of traffickers and trafficking groups are active, including transnational crime organizations, smaller, opportunistic associations of traffickers and individuals with less sophisticated setups.²³ The amounts that change hands across borders depend on the form of exploitation, phase of trafficking and geographic region.²⁴ The exploitative services or products provided by the victim are generally the largest source of profit for traffickers.²⁵

IFFs associated with TIP relate to the cross-border transfer of:

- a. Costs and payments of the trafficking act, such as recruitment of trafficking victims and their transportation and accommodation,
- b. The costs of exercising means of control, such as through use of narcotic or psychoactive drugs;
- c. The costs of different forms of exploitation, such as facilitating premises for sexual exploitation or forced labour;
- d. Income from the provision of exploitative services, such as prostitution of others, forced labour, exploitation of begging and products produced through exploitation;
- e. Income from the sale of a person, including forced marriage
- f. Crime proceeds from trafficking in persons, such as through investing or money laundering.

Fig. 2 Examples of IFFs in the context of TIP by type of actors involved

Direction of Value Transfer	Illicit Financial Flow
Client to Trafficker 	Payment by client resident ²⁶ in a country to trafficker resident in another country in the context of sale of a person
Client to Trafficker 	Payment by client resident in a country to trafficker resident in any other country for products or services provided through exploitation Payment made on behalf of client by third party, resident in a country, to trafficker resident in any other country, for exploitative products or services





22 Trafficking in persons is defined as: "recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs." Trafficking in adults therefore comprises the trafficking act, the means of control and the purpose of exploitation. The element of the means is not necessary to constitute the crime if the victims are children. The list of potential forms of exploitation that can constitute the purpose of the trafficking act is non-exhaustive.

23 UNODC, "Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018" (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

24 UNODC, "Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018" (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9); United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants". Available at www.unodc.org/res/som (accessed on 11 April 2023).

25 Elizabeth M. Wheaton and others, "Economics of Human Trafficking", *International Migration*, vol. 48, No. 4 (August 2010).

26 The use of the term "resident" throughout refers to the country where the person in question has their centre of economic interest. See: UNODC and UNCTAD, "Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows". Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/IFF_Conceptual_Framework_EN.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2023).

Direction of Value Transfer	Illicit Financial Flow
Trafficker to Trafficker 	Value transferred by trafficker, resident in a country, to accomplice resident in any other country, as remuneration or to cover costs incurred for transportation, accommodation, provision of fraudulent documents, other running costs
Trafficker to Official 	Value transferred as bribe to facilitate trafficking by trafficker resident in one country to an official who is resident in another country
Trafficker to Trafficker 	Value transferred as salary by trafficker resident in a country to accomplice resident in any other country
Trafficking proceeds 	Transfer of proceeds of trafficking from one country to another Money laundering of trafficking proceeds between two or more countries

While they are different crimes, there are **connections between SOM and TIP**. Refugees and migrants who use smugglers may be exploited along the route or once they are at the destination, either by the same perpetrators who engage in smuggling, or by other criminals. Smugglers may actually turn into traffickers when they exploit refugees and migrants in a situation of debt bondage to pay back money owed for smuggling services.²⁷ Smuggled migrants and refugees are also generally in circumstances of vulnerability due to limited economic means, isolation, and a lack of support networks, thus heightening their risk of being exploited.²⁸

Nevertheless, not all smuggled migrants and refugees become victims of TIP and not all victims of TIP are smuggled migrants and refugees.²⁹ TIP can take place domestically as well as internationally — many victims of trafficking travel or are transported regu-

larly across borders, while others are exploited within their own country.³⁰ While some domestic trafficking cases are not associated with any IFFs, other cases may involve cross-border transfers to actors located outside the country.

IFFs arise when the movement of finance, commodities or services across international borders is involved in the commission of SOM or TIP.³¹ The countries affected by the IFFs may be the same as those affected by smuggling or trafficking (countries of origin, transit and destination), or they may differ, with additional countries affected by the IFFs related to payments, costs, income and crime proceeds. Some IFFs may relate to perpetrators involved in both TIP and SOM.

27 Elizabeth M. Wheaton and others, "Economics of Human Trafficking", *International Migration*, vol. 48, No. 4 (August 2010).

28 Ibid.

29 Art. 3, para (a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2237, p. 319; Doc. A/55/383.

30 In 2020, 60 per cent of detected victims were reported as trafficked domestically (within their country of citizenship), and in 2019, the proportion was 55 per cent. UNODC, "Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022" (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

31 For a detailed discussion and a statistical definition of IFF under SDG 16.4.1 see UNODC and UNCTAD, "Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows". Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/IFF_Conceptual_Framework_EN.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2023).



DEFINING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

For the purpose of statistical measurement, IFFs are defined as: “financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer or use, that reflect an exchange of value and that cross-country borders.”

- **Illicit in origin, transfer, or use.** A flow of value is considered illicit if it is illicitly generated (for example, income from criminal activities), illicitly transferred (for example, violating currency controls) or illicitly used (for example, for covering the costs of smuggling or trafficking). The flow can be legally generated, transferred or used, but it must be illicit in at least one of these aspects.

- **Exchange of value, in addition to financial transfers.** Exchange of value includes exchange of goods and services, and financial and non-financial assets. For instance, illicit cross-border bartering, meaning the illicit exchange of goods and services for other goods and services, is considered an IFF.

- **IFFs measure a flow of value over a given time,** as opposed to a stock measure, which would be the accumulation of value.

- **Flows that cross a border.** This includes assets that cross borders and assets where the ownership changes from a resident of a country to a non-resident, even if the assets remain in the same jurisdiction. Here, the term “resident” follows an economic rather than a legal definition: A resident of a country has their centre of economic interest within that country; the residency is thus independent of nationality or residence permit.

An important distinction is made between two different stages where IFFs can be generated, which reflect two different purposes:

- IFFs linked to **income generation** are cross-border flows that are performed in the context of the provision of services and that directly generate illicit income for an actor during an illicit activity.

- IFFs linked to **income management** are cross-border flows linked to the use of illicit income (such as crime proceeds) for investment in financial and non-financial assets or for consuming goods and services.

See: UNODC and UNCTAD (2020), “Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows”.

The market size of SOM or TIP describes the overall **income** generated by these criminal activities within a country during a defined period (typically a year). “Within a country or region” follows the principles

of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculations and considers the illicit income from SOM or TIP by people whose centre of economic interest is in that country.³²

Fig. 3 Measuring IFFs



Income generation is calculated on the basis of three main aggregates: gross income, intermediate expenditure/costs and value added (net income):

- **Illicit gross income** refers to the value of the illicit services provided, or products produced in a given period (e.g., year) by residents of a country (people with their centre of economic interest in that country).³³
- **Illicit intermediate expenditure** refers to the value of inputs that smugglers or traffickers use to facilitate the crime, for example, transportation.³⁴
- **Illicit net income** is gross income minus intermediate expenditure. It is the income earned by all smugglers or traffickers after subtracting the costs incurred.³⁵

³² Here, a resident of a country has their centre of economic interest within the country. This definition is different from a legal one and follows the Balance of Payments statistics, see International Monetary Fund, “Balance of Payments Manual”, para 58. Available at <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/bopman.pdf> (accessed on 11 April 2023).

³³ Or region. For the sake of brevity, only country is used in the following. UNODC and UNCTAD, “Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows”. Available at https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/IFF_Conceptual_Framework_EN.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2023).

³⁴ Ibid, UNODC and UNCTAD, “Conceptual Framework for the statistical measurement of illicit financial flows”.

³⁵ Ibid.

1.2. Methodology

This Study analyses the available evidence on illicit financial flows (IFFs) associated with smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP) originating in GLO.ACT partner countries. More detailed information can be found in the Annexes.

Focus Group Discussions

Four focus group discussions were held with participants from government agencies, law enforcement, and humanitarian aid organizations held in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Key Informant Interviews

Key informants interviewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and the Netherlands included ten law enforcement and government officials, representatives of non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations.

Interviews with Migrants

A total of 23 migrants and refugees (two women and twenty-one men) from GLO.ACT partner countries, as well as from Syria, were interviewed during 2020-2021 in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Denmark. Information from in-depth interviews conducted in 2019 with migrants and refugees from GLO.ACT partner countries and Syria in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia in the framework of UNODC's Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans (MACRO) project were also used in this Study.³⁶ These interviews contain information relevant to the topic and provide anecdotal information on the experiences of the interviewees.

As such, they have been used in this Study not for the purposes of identifying trends and patterns, but rather as individual cases.

Case Law

This Study is also informed by an analysis of 33 TIP and SOM cases submitted by 11 Member States to the UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.³⁷ In total, 176 cases from 16 countries were analysed.

Literature Review

The findings from the field research were analysed and triangulated with data from official submissions by Member States to UNODC in relation to 404 victims of TIP.³⁸ This was complemented by a review of relevant secondary literature, including studies by UNODC and other international organizations as well as academic literature.

Expert Group Meetings

The draft of the Study was reviewed by experts in the field of IFFs and/or in TIP and SOM through two rounds of Expert Group Meetings (EGM). The first EGM held in February 2021 was attended by 36 experts, and the second EGM held in October 2022 was attended by 35 experts.

Disclaimers

The field research provides qualitative information to shed light on IFFs related to TIP and SOM originating in GLO.ACT partner countries. It does not provide a representative, quantitative sample of the relevant interviews. Based on the availability of data and the feasibility of field research, the Study

36 On the basis of the 2012 UNODC-INEGI Centre of Excellence framework on Organized Crime, UNODC set out to develop a statistical and analytical framework to measure and assess organized crime in the Western Balkans. Six countries and territories were included, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 (1999). The framework took a holistic approach in measuring both the "who" and the "what" of organized crime, dividing the concept into five dimensions: state response, enablers, OC activities, organized criminal groups (OCGs), and economic value of illicit markets of organized crime. See: UNODC, "Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans". Available at www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/OC/Measuring-OC-in-WB.pdf (accessed on 11 April 2023).

37 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, SHERLOC Case Law Database. Available at <https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/v3/sherloc/cldb/index.html?lng=en> (accessed on 11 April 2023).

38 Trafficking in persons data submitted by Member States via questionnaire to UNODC for the "Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons 2018 and 2020". UNODC, "Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020" (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3). UNODC, "Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018" (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.19.IV.2).

necessarily focuses on TIP and SOM in and from GLO.ACT partner countries, with European countries as destinations. Less information and data were available on other transit and destination countries, but it is referenced where available. More detailed information on the methodology can be found in the annexes.

Due to the very limited possibilities for conducting field research during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic, the countries of transit and destination

were selected not on the basis of their relevance to TIP and SOM from GLO.ACT partner countries, but rather on the feasibility of conducting such research. The evidence from these countries should therefore not be taken as representative, but as indicative of individual cases and experiences.

It should also be noted that the information from the interviews is relevant to the situation at the time of interview (2019-2021) and therefore should not be assumed as representative of the situation since then.



KEY FINDINGS RELATING TO ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS ASSOCIATED WITH SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Key Finding 1

People leaving their countries due to conflict, persecution, or other circumstances include those who use the services of smugglers, or those who fall prey to trafficking in persons. Both scenarios have an impact on illicit financial flows.

Key Finding 2

The crimes of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons generate considerable IFFs. This impacts not only the countries directly affected by smuggling or trafficking (countries of origin, transit and destination), but also third countries affected by IFFs due to related payments, costs, and income, as well as the transfer and management of crime proceeds. This Study has demonstrated that it is the highly organized criminal groups, rather than individuals and loosely connected, flexible criminal networks, that make the most financial gains from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants and generate illicit financial flows on a transnational scale.

Key Finding 3

While smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are distinct crimes, they are closely linked in practice as they often occur along the same routes, use the same methods of transportation, and in some cases, are perpetrated by the same individuals or groups. Thus, some IFFs may relate to perpetrators involved in both trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

Key Finding 4

With the advances of the information and communications technology (ICT) around the world, using such technologies in the commission of transnational crimes, including in cross-border trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, has also become more widespread. For example, smugglers sell and send fraudulent travel documents to clients via the Internet and traffickers frequently use online platforms to recruit victims. Cyber-enabled transnational crimes facilitate cross-border value transfers and generate IFFs, including through making additional profits or the transfer, management or laundering of crime proceeds.

CHAPTER 2

Illicit Financial Flows associated with Smuggling of Migrants

2.1. Smuggling of Migrants from GLO.ACT Partner Countries

There are many factors that affect the costs, fees and proceeds of smuggling of migrants (SOM), such as types of actors involved, the routes used, the modes of transport and the profiles of smuggled refugees and migrants. This in turn also impacts the size of illicit financial flows (IFFs) generated when these sums cross borders. Smuggling by land and sea are typically cheaper and organized differently than travel by air, which thus impacts the size of the associated IFFs. For example, while forged travel documents are usually a necessity for smuggling by air, smugglers operating by land and sea do not always provide such documents to their clients.³⁹

Given its geographic proximity to the countries considered, and its location between Asia and Europe, Türkiye is a natural destination and transit country for regular and irregular migration and migrant smuggling. For example, according to humanitarian aid workers interviewed in Iraq for this Study, the majority of Iraqis smuggled to Europe first contact a smuggler in Türkiye.⁴⁰ In recent years, Türkiye has been a transit point for both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Central Mediterranean routes to Europe. As of 2019, the Ministry of Interior of Türkiye prevented approximately 84,000 seaborne and over 41,000 overland attempts to depart Türkiye and irregularly enter the EU.⁴¹ During the period 2020-2022, the largest groups in terms of nationality among people intercepted as irregular migrants in Türkiye were Afghans, Syrians and Pakistanis.⁴²

The experiences described by an Iraqi man interviewed for this Study provide an illustrative example of a migratory journey that combines independent and smuggler-facilitated travel, the latter of which generates IFFs. He travelled in the company of other refugees and migrants to Izmir, a port city on the Wes-

tern Turkish coast, and approached a smuggler who had been recommended to him by friends, asking him to take them by boat to Greece. The group paid half of the total fee of around US\$800 per person immediately, and the remainder when they met the smugglers at the boat just before departure.⁴³ Both payments constitute IFFs, given that the smuggling clients had their centres of economic interest in Iraq and other origin countries, and the smuggler had his centre of economic interest in Türkiye.

In another example, a group of migrants in Greece independently ordered a taxi to northwest Greece before crossing through the Western Balkans using smartphones and GPS to navigate. However, crossing into the EU through Hungary from Serbia proved difficult, and the group *“waited over a week in this refugee camp with tents and things like that and then [they found] three smugglers. [They] paid them €1,500 per person.”* After several failed attempts to irregularly enter the EU, the money was returned to them. They later procured the services of another smuggler who used different routes but charged the same price. After assisting the group in crossing the border into Hungary, the smuggler referred them to another group who facilitated the journey to Austria.⁴⁴ Again in this example, as the migrants were not residents of Serbia nor Hungary and were passing through on their way to another destination, their centres of economic interest were in other countries. These transactions constitute IFFs.

39 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

40 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, Humanitarian Aid Workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

41 Frontex, “Risk Analysis for 2022/2023” (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022); “Risk Analysis for 2020” (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

42 See: Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Interior: Presidency of Migration Management. Irregular Migration Statistics. Available at <https://en.goc.gov.tr/irregular-migration> (accessed on 15 February 2023).

43 Interview DEN_025_M, 24, Iraqi man, in Denmark, 26 February 2021.

44 Ibid.



Case 1

ORGANIZED SMUGGLING FROM THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO NORTHERN EUROPE

In a 2012 case reported by the French authorities, smugglers of Iranian migrants to Western European destinations who played various roles were located in transit countries along the route, including Türkiye, Greece, Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and France. The prices per person for journeys within the EU ranged from €1,500 to €10,000. The main organizer of the network was in Paris, France, and kept in contact with smugglers operating along the routes by phone and other means. He

procured fraudulent travel documents from a supplier in Greece at prices of €700-€2,500 per document. Therefore, IFFs related to smuggling payments, costs and proceeds flowed between: I.R. Iran as the centre of economic interest of the Iranians being smuggled; transit countries along the route; destination countries in Western Europe; and France as the location and centre of economic interest of the main organizer.

France, Court of Appeals of Paris, *Dossier No. 11/05649*, UNODC Case No. FRAh024, 5 April 2012. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.z

GLO.ACT partner countries are important countries of origin for people smuggled to Europe.⁴⁵ During 2022, Frontex, the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency, detected 36,031 attempts by Afghans to irregularly enter the EU by land and sea, mostly on the Western Balkans route (23,409), followed by the Central Mediterranean route (7,366) and the Eastern Mediterranean route (5,120). During 2022, Frontex registered 12,764 attempts by Pakistanis to irregularly enter the EU, mostly on the Western Balkans route (6,370), the Central Mediterranean route (3,553), and the Eastern Mediterranean route (2,818). Frontex registered 5,181 attempts by Iraqis to irregularly enter the EU, mostly on the Western Balkans route (1,896), the Central Mediterranean route (1,790) and the Eastern Mediterranean route (1,180), during this same year. A total of 3,350 attempts to irregularly enter the EU by Iranians were recorded by Frontex, on the Central Mediterranean route (2,353), the Eastern Mediterranean route (584) and the Western Balkan route (305).⁴⁶ The figure below provides an overview of detections of attempts at irregular entry by people from GLO.ACT partner countries during the five-year period 2018-2022.⁴⁷

SOM, by definition, involves a financial transaction or exchange of other material benefit between a migrant or refugee (“client”) and a smuggler. The exact proportion of these irregular entries that were facilitated by a smuggler for a financial or material benefit is not known, but it is likely to be the majority. Field studies assess that 99 per cent of Afghans on the move interviewed between 2019 and 2020 had used a smuggler at some point during their journey to Europe.⁴⁸ Many of these people subsequently applied for international protection in EU countries, particularly in Germany and Greece, as well as in the UK.⁴⁹

45 Angeliki Dimitriadi, *Irregular Afghan Migration to Europe: At the Margins, Looking In* (London, United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan (2018)); International Organization for Migration, “Migration Flows from Iraq to Europe: Reasons Behind Migration” (Baghdad, Iraq, International Organization for Migration, Iraq Mission, 2016); International Organization for Migration, “Pakistan Migration Snapshot” (Bangkok, Thailand, International Organization for Migration, Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, 2019).

46 Frontex, “Detections of Illegal Border-Crossing Statistics”. Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed 15 February 2023). These statistics do not cover attempted irregular entry by air.

47 Ibid.

48 Mixed Migration Centre, “MMC Europe 4Mi Snapshot – April 2021: Smuggling dynamics for Afghans on the move towards Europe”. Available at <https://mixedmigration.org/resource/4mi-snapshot-smuggling-dynamics-for-afghans-on-the-move-toward-europe/> (accessed on 11 April 2023).

49 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Asylum Applications”, Refugee Data Finder. Available at www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=fl08yf (accessed on 15 March 2022).

Fig. 4 Western Balkan route to the EU⁵⁰




Fig. 5 Central Mediterranean route to the EU⁵¹





Fig. 6 Eastern Mediterranean route to the EU⁵²



50 UNODC elaboration of Frontex data. Frontex dataset on Detections of Illegal Border Crossings Statistics, available at https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2023/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_20230302.xlsx (accessed on 6 April 2023).

51 UNODC elaboration of Frontex data. Ibid.

52 UNODC elaboration of Frontex data. Ibid.

2.2. Smuggling Actors

The process of migrant smuggling requires the actor(s) to perform various roles. Some of the typical roles are outlined below.⁵³

The coordinator or organizer is the person who has the overall responsibility for the smuggling operation, much like the manager of a company. He or she might direct, employ or subcontract other individuals participating in the operation. The coordinator/organizer oversees the whole process and can assign smugglers to an operation or to a specific part of an operation, select the route and mode or modes of transport to be used and arrange accommodation.

The recruiters advertise the smuggling “services” and establish contact between the smugglers and the prospective clients seeking to migrate. Recruiters often lure such persons into illegal migration by deliberately misinforming them about both the migration process and conditions in the destination country. Recruiters may collect initial fees charged to the smuggled migrants for transportation. They may also use the services of persons who do not directly recruit people to be smuggled but who provide information as to where such people can be found.

The transporters or guides carry out the practical part of the smuggling operation by guiding and accompanying migrants en route through one or more countries and across borders. The smuggled migrants may be handed over to another transporter/guide at different stages of the journey. In many cases, transporters/guides are people from border regions who have good local knowledge. These are also the actors most likely to be intercepted by law enforcement. When intercepted while smuggling a group of migrants, they often attempt to pass themselves off as one of the migrants. Since transporters/guides are usually easy to recruit, their loss from the network does not necessarily affect the smuggling operation in any serious way. However, they play a crucial role in determining whether or not the migrants are successful in crossing borders. Moreover, they are in a

position to mistreat or exploit those they are smuggling. It is often the role of the transporter/guide that has the greatest impact on the reputation of the smuggling network as a whole.

The spotters, drivers, messengers, and enforcers perform ad hoc jobs that are part of the smuggling process. Spotters, for instance, are responsible for providing specific information about checks by police, border guards or army personnel. Spotters often travel ahead of the vehicle carrying the smuggled migrants and communicate with it by mobile phone to warn of possible checks. Enforcers are responsible for safeguarding the operation, to which end they may use threats or violence against the smuggled people in order to keep them from making noise or moving too much during the journey.

The ad hoc service providers and suppliers often have an established link with the smugglers and are paid a share of the proceeds from the smuggling operation in return for their role. In many cases they collaborate with more than one smuggling network or group to maximize the use of their services and thus their earnings from the smuggling business. For instance, owners or builders of boats may be complicit in the use of their boats in smuggling migrants.

The collaborators include corrupt public officials (e.g., corrupt border police, soldiers, immigration officials, employees in embassies and consulates and police at ports) who may be bribed to turn a blind eye or otherwise facilitate the smuggling process. Other individuals may include: forgers of passports, visas and other travel documents; hotel owners who knowingly provide accommodation for the migrant smugglers and smuggled migrants; train conductors; taxi drivers; travel agents; or airline staff.

It should be noted, however, that some individuals facilitate the smuggling process unknowingly (such as taxi drivers), while others may be aware that they are playing a passive role in the smuggling process but turn a blind eye (for instance, a taxi driver may be aware that he or she is transporting a smuggled

53 UNODC (2010), Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants, Tool 2: Actors and processes in the smuggling of migrants, p.3. Available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Toolkit_Smuggling_of_Migrants/10-50812_Tool2_eBook.pdf.

migrant to a safe house but may think that it is not his or her business to interfere).

There is a wide range of organizational arrangements in migrant smuggling operations. Low-level, opportunistic smugglers generally work across only one border or one leg of the journey playing most of, if not all, the roles described above. Larger smuggling networks, however, operate with a clear division of work among the actors spanning over a broader geographical area. The diversity in organizational arrangements is also found in smuggling operations relating to GLO.ACT partner countries. According to Afghan government officials who participated in a focus group for this Study: *“Some [smugglers] are in the [same] provinces, some of them are in other provinces, and some of them are outside of Afghanistan”*.⁵⁴

In relation to the opportunistic type, people living near borders in rural villages seeking to earn some extra money guide people irregularly crossing borders from GLO.ACT partner countries. Smuggling networks operating in the region are usually loosely connected, informal and not strictly hierarchical.⁵⁵ Different individuals and groups also work in flexible networks, whereby members can be easily replaced with little or no disruption to the smuggling activities.⁵⁶

In Afghanistan, as typically in most countries of origin, local smugglers who make the first contact with their clients (intending refugees and migrants) often operate in the same locality as their clients, who are referred to them by their friends or relatives.⁵⁷ Accordingly, initial payments for services may not constitute IFFs. In an interview conducted by UNODC in Bosnia in 2021, a Pakistani man said that he had made contact with smugglers through friends: *“Some of my friends in Italy... I contacted [asking] how to go to Italy, which smuggler, how much money, and so on”*.⁵⁸

Smugglers may operate travel and labour recruitment agencies that are seemingly legitimate in order to identify clients. People intending to leave the country are offered services by smuggling networks who act as legitimate travel agencies.⁵⁹ Smugglers may also operate as overseas recruitment agencies assisting employers to recruit foreign employees. Financial flows resulting from the smuggling activity can be registered as legal income, making the related IFFs more difficult to detect. If the operation uses a legitimate business as a front, IFFs may be recorded, processed, and transferred together with legal funds.



Case 2

OPERATING UNDER A LEGAL BUSINESS FRONT TO SMUGGLE MIGRANTS FROM BANGLADESH TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

In an older case from 2006, reported by authorities in the United Kingdom, two men conducted a smuggling operation facilitating the irregular entry and stay of Bangladeshis into the United Kingdom, using a legitimate business as a front. Under the guise of being a “law association”, the two smugglers forged documents, so that

their clients could apply for visas at the British High Commission in Bangladesh or at the United Kingdom Home Office. If these applications failed, one of the smugglers dealt directly with the British High Commission or the Home Office.

United Kingdom, Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), *R v Tipu & Bari*, EWCA Crim 1859, UNODC Case No. GBRx035, 20 June 2006. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

54 Interview with AFG_031_FGD, Afghan government officials interviewed by UNODC, in Afghanistan (virtually), 9 February 2021.

55 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9). Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

56 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

57 Nassim Majidi and Richard Danziger, ‘Afghanistan’, in Marie McAuliffe and Frank Laczko (eds.), *“Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: a global review of the emerging evidence base”*, International Organization for Migration, pp. 161-186, 2016.

58 Interview with BOS_016_M, 29, Pakistani man, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 March 2021.

59 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9), p. 49.

In Pakistan, there have been reports of migrant smuggling activity by smugglers operating under the legal façade of travel agencies and visa consultants. They offered services ranging from providing fraudulent documents to organizing flights and accommodation.⁶⁰ Local smugglers then connect clients to other smugglers based in transit countries,⁶¹ and so any related payments for smuggling services, covering of costs, salaries, and proceeds, are likely to generate IFFs.

Less is known about smugglers in Iraq, but based on cases analysed for this Study, both individual smugglers and organized criminal groups are involved in the smuggling of migrants. According to humanitarian aid workers who participated in a focus group in Iraq for this Study:

"Smugglers do differ. Like there are smugglers who are civilians and it's just their job to do small-scale smuggling and they are connected to other parties... From the cases that I come across, the smugglers mostly have been civilians... for the cases that I'm receiving now, it's mostly in the form of individuals like just residents of that area, trying to transport people to the borders because they have connections or they know other roads that, as my colleague said, do not have checkpoints with armed militants. So, it's mostly individuals".⁶²

High-level organizers of smuggling, on the other hand, may be based in the countries of origin, transit, or destination of their clients or in other countries. They may manage income, costs and proceeds remotely, either through wire or banking institution transfers, informal money transfer systems or delivery by cash courier⁶³ (for more on value transfer systems in the context of IFFs associated with SOM and TIP, see Chapter 4). In such cases, the organizer or organizers act as managers of the business, making profits

and paying a portion of these as salaries to lower-level smuggling actors.⁶⁴

If smuggling is more organized at a transnational level, then the IFFs may also affect countries other than those of origin, transit, and destination. They can also be inward and outward IFFs affecting countries where higher-level smugglers have their centre of economic interest. When the mode of transport is air travel, a member of a smuggling group may travel together with the clients. More organized criminal groups are involved in smuggling by air, due to the challenges involved.

In transit countries through which people from GLO.ACT partner countries travelling towards Europe are smuggled, smugglers from origin countries often cooperate in loose networks with nationals of the transit countries, who know the routes. The different actors collaborate with changing and varied individuals and groups who occasionally cooperate on specific tasks or operations.⁶⁵

In other instances, smuggling is carried out by separate, unaffiliated smugglers, who operate on an ad hoc basis, such as at a border crossing or across areas where public transportation is less readily available. They receive relatively small payments from clients. These small sums, however, still generally constitute IFFs, as they are transferred between people from GLO.ACT partner countries and people residing in transit countries such as in West Asia or the Western Balkans.

In an interview conducted by UNODC with prosecutors in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2021, a prosecutor described how actors may start out on a more ad hoc basis with smaller IFFs involved, and then gradually become more organized and start to deal

60 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "Smuggling of Migrants from Pakistan: Reasons, Routes, and Risks" (Country Office Pakistan, 2016).

61 Nassim Majidi and Richard Danziger, 'Afghanistan', in Marie McAuliffe and Frank Laczo (eds.), "Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: a global review of the emerging evidence base", International Organization for Migration, pp. 161-186, 2016, p 166.

62 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

63 Collection of information from cases submitted by Member States to the UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database. United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, SHERLOC Case Law Database. Available at <https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/v3/sherloc/cldb/index.html?lng=en> (accessed on 11 April 2023).

64 Ibid.

65 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

with much larger IFFs if demand for migrant smuggling increases:

*"What I notice is that the group starts with a couple of people, and as the illegal activities grow, so does the number of people involved. Sometimes these people happened to be there, where they were brought to transport something and only on the spot did they notice that they were migrants. [...] Most people, relatively younger, up to the age of 30, thought that they could easily make money with this transportation. They took part in transferring, taking over migrants, and transporting them to parts of the Western Balkans. As [the demand] grew, so did the territory of operation."*⁶⁶

Highly structured crime organizations also operate in transit countries along the route to Europe. The income generated tends to be larger as the crime organizations include multiple actors in different countries. Moreover, smuggling income, costs and proceeds are being transferred between origin, transit, destination, and other countries, depending on the centre of economic interest of the smugglers involved.⁶⁷



Case 3

PROFITS OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING BY ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS

In a 2014 court case in Austria, a group of eight Afghan, Indian and Pakistani men were accused of smuggling 278 Pakistani people into Austria over a five-month period. Austrian officials estimated that the smuggling clients had paid between €6,500 and €10,000 each to

be brought from Pakistan to Europe, generating a total income of €3 million for the organized criminal group involved. However, the eight accused men received only a small portion of the profits from this enterprise.

Austria, Regional Court for Wiener Neustadt (Landesgericht), Servitenkloster Smuggling Case, UNODC Case No. AUTx009, 6 May 2014. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

The organizer may also be contacted by family members of potential clients, who make the payment on behalf of the person intending to travel. This involves the country of residence of the family members in the associated outward IFF. For example, a Bosnian prosecutor interviewed in 2021 described the *modus operandi*:

*"The organizer [based in Bosnia and Herzegovina] is in contact with family members of migrants in Afghanistan, who call directly or [hear] by word of mouth that this person can transfer someone illegally. Then family members in Afghanistan contact [the person] organizing the smuggling and negotiate the price and persons that should be smuggled."*⁶⁸

According to these prosecutors, group members communicate with the organizer at all times and may

send a photo to prove the work is complete before receiving their remuneration.⁶⁹

Transporters, guides, spotters, providers of accommodation and ad hoc service providers are active along smuggling routes, principally in transit countries, and in some cases their actions constitute smuggling offences.⁷⁰ Other actors who have less direct interaction with smuggling clients include fraudulent document providers⁷¹ and providers of money laundering services to launder the proceeds of smuggling. Document providers either work with specific smuggling networks or in loose collaboration with multiple smugglers, with the price of the service varying according to the quality and desirability of the documents provided, as well as other factors.⁷²

66 Interview with BOS_06_KII, prosecutors, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.

67 Based on interviews conducted by UNODC for this study and cases submitted by Member States to the SHERLOC Case Law Database; Interview of MACRO – S-04-11-S-34-31, 30, Iranian man interviewed by UNODC for MACRO, in Serbia, 2020.

68 Interview with BOS_05_KII, prosecutors interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.

69 Ibid.

70 Collection of information from cases submitted by Member States to the UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

71 Ibid.

72 European Migrant Smuggling Centre, "EMSC 4th Annual Activity Report – 2020" (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2020).

Finally, law enforcement and government officials, including border guards, military personnel, immigration officials, police, staff in embassies and consulates and port authorities, may receive bribes in order to facilitate smuggling. The bribe is usually a fixed amount or a share of the criminal proceeds.⁷³ In the course of research conducted for this Study, anecdotal information on bribery suggested a lack of adequate detection and reporting.

The forms of bribery are diverse. A key informant interviewed for this Study stated that an Iraqi man intending to leave the country paid a corrupt government official a sum of approximately US\$5,000 at an airport to get his draft evasion overlooked.⁷⁴ Though this constitutes neither smuggling of migrants (no facilitation of irregular entry) nor an IFF (the money was exchanged between residents of the same country), it is indicative of the types of bribery and the sums involved. An Iraqi man interviewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina described cooperation between smugglers and authorities along the Western Balkan route:

"We were in a bus with 32 people and in front of us was a car. In the car was a state official...I think he [was] with the police, he [opened] the road, he 'cleaned' the road for us".⁷⁵

2.3. Payment Modalities

Payment for the smuggling of migrants (SOM) from GLO.ACT partner countries generally falls under one of two categories: monetary payments from clients to smugglers or labour connected to a debt from the smuggling fee, which may or may not be exploitative. Some smugglers offer one payment fee, under which they guarantee multiple attempts if the

first is unsuccessful.⁷⁶ Although all SOM involves a financial transaction, or the transfer of some other material benefit between a client (refugee or migrant) and a smuggler, the form of this payment varies. This influences the amount, frequency, and direction of associated illicit financial flows.

For reaching more distant destinations in a relatively short period of time, the *comprehensive package* model is the most common.⁷⁷ It covers the entirety of the journey, from origin to destination, in one payment, which includes all transportation and border crossings.⁷⁸ Offering this package requires a high level of organization and the existence of efficient networks, meaning that it is generally provided by organized criminal groups, for a very high price.⁷⁹ Some smugglers may request upfront payment, whereas others may allow payment only at the destination. Nonetheless, the high cost of certain full package smuggling routes leads to victims incurring large debts, making them susceptible to forced labour or forced prostitution.⁸⁰

The most expensive comprehensive smuggling package offered to people leaving GLO.ACT partner countries combines transport modalities by air and land. Comprehensive packages for air travel are most commonly purchased by Iranians, and to a lesser extent by other groups. In addition to various forms of transportation, comprehensive packages also include accommodation at the various transit points and potentially also the provision of fraudulent travel and/or residence documents. In general, only sophisticated, well-organized transnational organized criminal groups are in a position to offer such services. Air travel, primarily used with comprehensive packages from the region, requires, in addition to the provision

73 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, "Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better Prevent the Crime" (Vienna, Austria, 2010).

74 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

75 Interview with BOS_010_M, 44, Iraqi man, by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 March 2021.

76 Paolo Campana and Lorraine Gelsthorpe, "Choosing a Smuggler: Decision-making", *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* (July 2020), p. 12.

77 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Can we put an end to human smuggling?* Migration Policy Debates (December 2015). Available at: www.oecd.org/migration/Can%20we%20put%20an%20end%20to%20human%20smuggling.pdf.

of high-quality fraudulent travel documents, purchases in the legal economy.⁸¹

The IFFs associated with comprehensive packages involve, given their high price, flows of large sums of

money, particularly the IFFs related to the payment by the client to the smuggling organizer. However, as these packages are inaccessible for many potential clients due to their high cost, this type of smuggling-related IFF is less common.



Case 4

COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE FROM TÜRKİYE USING MULTIPLE MODES OF TRANSPORT

In a UK court case from 2012, an Iranian national was smuggled from Türkiye to the United Kingdom by various smugglers operating along different parts of the route. The man found a smuggler in Türkiye, who arranged the entire journey for an up-front fee of €12,000. The smu-

ggling journey, from Türkiye to the United Kingdom via Greece and Italy, involved different modes of transportation including airplane and train, accommodation, and fraudulent documentation.

United Kingdom, Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R. v S.J., EWCA Crim 2565, UNODC Case No. UKh006, 22 November 2012. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

The marketplace smuggling model, entails smugglers offering different smuggling services in a setup that is similar to a marketplace. At key smuggling hubs, such as Istanbul and Izmir in Türkiye, services are offered by competing smugglers who actively seek to identify clients.⁸² Smuggling hubs can also play an important role in the dissemination of information on routes and prices.⁸³ In these cases, IFFs involving smaller sums move between refugees' and migrants' countries of origin, smuggling hubs in transit countries, and centres of economic interest of smuggling actors.

In an interview conducted for this Study, an Iraqi woman identified cafés in a certain district in the city of Istanbul, Türkiye, as a key hub for smuggling activity to the EU:

*"There it is easy to spot [smugglers] and talk to them if you want to leave Istanbul. My husband went there to look for the man who had taken our money, but he could not find him there, and it is hard to know who is working with who."*⁸⁴

Similarly, in Izmir, a town on the western coast of Türkiye, an Iraqi man described:

*"There is, like, a café where they give you papers and boat and all that. [The others who accompanied him on the bus] know all these things because they also want to go to Greece or Germany or something like this."*⁸⁵

In many cases, however, clients make relatively small cash payments for individual services to opportunistic actors, who supplement other sources of income with migrant smuggling or get involved in it on an ad hoc basis, if and when opportunities arise. As this is particularly common in transit countries, and the clients usually have their centre of economic interest in origin countries, these payments constitute IFFs, but on a very small scale.

The services offered by smugglers often depend on the perceived wealth of the potential clients. In some cases, smugglers act as job brokers or offer accommodation.⁸⁶

81 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), *Can we put an end to human smuggling?* Migration Policy Debates (December 2015). Available at: www.oecd.org/migration/Can%20we%20put%20an%20end%20to%20human%20smuggling.pdf.

82 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

83 Paolo Campana and Loraine Gelsthorpe, "Choosing a Smuggler: Decision-making", *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* (July 2020), p. 7.

84 Interview with DEN_022_M, 41, female, Iraqi, interviewed by UNODC, in Denmark, 21 February 2021.

85 Interview with DEN_024_M, 26, Iraqi man, interviewed by UNODC, in Denmark, 6 March 2021.

86 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

This illustrates the complexity of investigating and prosecuting smuggling cases. As mentioned in Section 2.2, while some individuals unknowingly aid the smuggling process, others may be acutely aware

part of their actions but decide to turn a blind eye. Proving the criminal intent of an actor is thus a persistent challenge in criminal investigations and prosecution.



Case 5

OPPORTUNISTIC SMUGGLING IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AT LOW COST

In a case reported by Serbia in 2016, a local resident agreed to help a group of 10 people, including Iraqis, to cross the border into Serbia from North Macedonia, for a fee of €20 per person. The smuggler met the refugees and migrants by coincidence while travelling from North Macedonia to Serbia on personal business. The refugees

and migrants themselves offered the smuggler the money in exchange for assistance in crossing the border. In this case, as with much opportunistic smuggling, the associated IFFs are quite small – a total of €200 were traced from the clients' countries of origin to Serbia – and may be quite infrequent.

Serbia, Higher Court of Vranje, Km. No. 25/16, UNODC Case No. SRBx016, 17 October 2016. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

2.4. IFFs associated with Smuggling Income

There are many factors that may determine the price of the smuggling services. Determinants of smuggling fees typically include:

- Nationality, sex and perceived wealth of the client;
- Type and quality of services provided;
- Motivation for the migration journey (e.g., fleeing conflict or persecution, labour migration);
- Route and duration of journey;
- Difficulty of travel, including border control measures;
- Control of transit territories by armed groups;
- Corruption;
- Provision of fraudulent documents;
- Degree of professionalism of the service provider;
- Risks and security during the journey;
- Attractiveness of the country of destination.⁸⁷

The fees also depend on the smuggling services that are covered in the package, which may include:

- Transportation (facilitating irregular entry into a country and/or enabling irregular stay);
- Accommodation (enabling irregular stay);
- Provision of fraudulent documents (passport, visa) for the purposes of smuggling;
- Bribes to officials;
- Protection fees to organized criminal groups or non-state armed groups.

The prices set by smugglers vary according to the different routes. The Eastern Mediterranean route from Türkiye to Greece is particularly well-documented in terms of prices. An Iraqi woman interviewed for this Study stated that her family paid a total of €9,000 for one family member to be smuggled from Türkiye to Denmark by sea and land.⁸⁸ Humanitarian aid workers interviewed in Iraq for this Study indicated that the price per person from Türkiye to European destinations is around US\$8,000.⁸⁹ Figure 7 below provides an overview of examples of fees paid for different segments of smuggling routes.

87 See, inter alia: UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9). ; Council of Europe, "Proceeds from Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Migration/Human Smuggling" (Strasbourg, MONEYVAL, 2005).

88 Interview with DEN_022_M, 41, female, Iraq, interviewed by UNODC, in Denmark, 21 February 2021.

89 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

Fig. 7 Average smuggling fees paid by route (multiple modes of transport)

Origin	Destination	Average Fee Paid (Per Client) in USD
Islamic Republic of Iran	United Kingdom (entire route)	\$12,000
Pakistan	Western European Countries (entire route)	\$11,926
Türkiye	Western European Countries (entire route)	\$7,719
Italy	Denmark	\$5,150
Türkiye	Greece	\$1,881
Türkiye	Serbia	\$2,954
Türkiye	Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$2,323
Islamic Republic of Iran	Türkiye	\$2,153
Afghanistan	Türkiye	\$2,147
Pakistan	Türkiye	\$1,752
Greece	Serbia	\$1,181
Afghanistan	Islamic Republic of Iran	\$1,413
Iraq	Türkiye	\$1,065
Southern border of Serbia	Northern border of Serbia	\$596
Greece	North Macedonia	\$565
Greece	Albania	\$235
Southern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Northern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$120

The Central Mediterranean Route is the second most commonly used route for irregular migration to Europe by people from GLO.ACT partner countries, after the Western Balkans route, as measured by interceptions during 2022.⁹⁰ This route is dominated by Libyan smuggling networks, who charge an average of between US\$1,500 and \$1,800 per client to smuggle people from Libya to Italy by boat.⁹¹ In 2017, the peak year for arrivals on this route, criminal organizations running smuggling operations

along this route were estimated to have earned a gross income of \$150 million, though in 2018 this had decreased to just over €24 million, and €12 million in 2019.⁹²

While information on fees for smuggling by air is limited, it appears to be the most expensive mode of smuggling from GLO.ACT partner countries to Europe, generally costing between US\$12,000 and \$18,000 per person.⁹³



Case 6

SMUGGLING BY AIR FROM BANGLADESH TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

In an older case reported by the authorities in Austria in 2006, Bangladeshi clients paid between \$8,500 and \$11,000 to be smuggled into the EU via the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Ukraine, mainly by air. The organized criminal group smuggled approximately 900 people into the EU over a three-year period.

This case illustrates the potential for larger IFFs associated with smuggling by air. Over a three-year period, the group made between \$7.65 and \$9.9 million in the early 2000s.

Austria, Federal Criminal Police, *Annual Report of 2006 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)* (Vienna, 2006), UNODC Case No. AUTx037, pp. 56-57. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

Smuggling by sea and/or land tends to be cheaper than air travel. In a case from 2014, reported by the authorities in Italy, Afghans, Iraqis and Pakistanis paid between US\$6,000 and US\$6,500 to be smuggled by boat from Türkiye to Italy.⁹⁴ Comprehensive smuggling packages that involve travel by land and sea from Pakistan to Greece are estimated to cost around US\$4,000.⁹⁵ An Iraqi man interviewed for this Study indicated that the trip from Izmir, Türkiye, to Greece in a plastic boat cost him €2,000.

Organized criminal groups typically charge higher fees, as their smuggling services are more sophisticated. They have the capacity to smuggle more clients, generating far larger IFFs than individual actors. For

example, in 2019, authorities in France and the Netherlands dismantled a criminal network involved in the smuggling of around 10,000 Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis and Syrians from the Western French cities of Le Mans and Poitiers to the United Kingdom by lorry and ferry, usually in groups of 20. Despite the relatively short duration of the journey as well as the overcrowded conditions, clients paid up to €7,000, and the organization earned around €70 million.⁹⁶

Higher fees are charged to smuggle children, due to the difficulties involved. While available information is dated, in 2010, smugglers charged between US\$7,000 and \$20,000 to smuggle a child from Afghanistan to Europe.⁹⁷

90 Frontex, "Migratory Map". Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed on 15 February 2023).

91 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime, "West Africa, North Africa and the Central Mediterranean", Observatory on Smuggling of Migrants (2021). Available at www.unodc.org/res/som/; Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2020" (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

92 Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2020" (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

93 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

94 Italy, Court of Catania (Tribunale di Catania), *Appeal against order of precautionary detention*, Proc. n. 2022/2014 R.I.M.C., UNODC Case No. ITAh007, 11 November 2014. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

95 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

96 European Migrant Smuggling Centre, "EMSC 4th Annual Activity Report – 2020" (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2020).

97 International Organization for Migration, "Afghanistan Migration Profile" (Kabul, Afghanistan, International Organization for Migration Afghanistan, 2014).

Children are far less commonly detected irregularly entering the EU.⁹⁸ As such, the IFFs associated with smuggling children are less frequent, though they may involve larger amounts.

Country-specific factors, such as conflict, also impact fees charged by smugglers. For example, in a focus group organized for this Study, an Iraqi humanitarian aid worker commented:

"I think this is the norm for smugglers to exploit points of vulnerabilities. Like when there's a crisis, then the prices get automatically doubled or get higher. So, he mentioned that they usually took \$100 when the situation erupted, then they started to charge \$150 or \$200 per person."⁹⁹

Some services generate more income for smugglers than others. Smugglers dealing in high-quality fraudulent documents can charge a significant mark-up. Fraudulent document prices vary according to how they are acquired (forgery vs. theft) and the country of the document (see Case 7 below).¹⁰⁰ For example, in 2019, authorities in Greece detected an organized criminal group that provided fraudulent travel documents, earning up to €13,000 per client.¹⁰¹

Fig. 8 Examples of fraudulent documents and prices, 2021¹⁰²

Citizenship of Client	Fraudulent Documents	Prices
Iraq	Visa (presumably to enter Türkiye)	\$1,130
	Foreign passport	approximately \$1,000
Afghanistan	Turkish visa	\$2,800 per adult and \$1,400 per child
Pakistan	Fraudulent passport plus airline ticket (purchased in Greece, nationality not specified)	\$4,000

Case 7

PRICES CHARGED BY AN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUP SMUGGLING IRANIANS TO EUROPE

In a case reported by the authorities in France in 2012, an organized criminal group smuggling Iranians to Europe was selling stolen passports for €700 each and forged passports for €1,500. The price for more desirable passports – such as forged Spanish passports – was up to €2,500. The smuggling group also charged varying prices based on the mode of transportation as well as the routes used during the journey. The prices per person were

as follows: from Calais, France to the United Kingdom by truck: €1,500; from Greece to France: €3,000; from Greece to Ireland: €10,000; and from Ireland to Canada: €15,000.

Source: France, Court of Appeals of Paris, *Dossier No. 11/05649*, UNODC Case No. FRAh024, 5 April 2012. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

98 Frontex, "Risk Analysis for 2020" (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

99 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

100 Based on interviews conducted by UNODC for this study and cases submitted by Member States to the SHERLOC Case Law Database.

101 European Migrant Smuggling Centre, "EMSC 4th Annual Activity Report – 2020" (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2020).

102 Source: Interviews conducted for this Study with Afghans, Iraqis and Pakistanis.

The gross income from smuggling of migrants (SOM) can be calculated as the average fees paid to smugglers multiplied by the number of smuggling incidents within a certain time period, such as a year. A smuggling incident refers to an individual or a group committing the crime of smuggling against another person, who is the subject of that crime. The calculations do not refer to the number of people smuggled, because one person may be smuggled multiple times:

Gross income = average fee for being smuggled x number of smuggling incidents.

The net income can be calculated by deducting intermediate expenditure (costs) of smuggling operations from gross income. Intermediate expenditure can be calculated as average costs borne by smugglers per client, multiplied by the number of smuggling incidents:

Net income = Gross income – (average expenditure x number of smuggling incidents)



Evidence on SOM worldwide indicates that, in 2016, at a minimum, 2.5 million smuggling incidents took place, generating a profit of US\$5.5-\$7 billion in 2016.¹⁰³ To determine the size of IFFs in the context of SOM from GLO.ACT partner countries to the EU, the gross income for smuggling, costs covered, “salaries” transferred, and crime proceeds processed must be estimated. In each of these cases, the proportion of the transactions that are cross-border must be determined, as well as the direction of the flows.

Estimating the gross income then involves estimating the average fee paid by each smuggling client per smuggling incident, as well as the number of smuggling incidents. The number of smuggling incidents is a proportion of the number of times people from GLO.ACT partner countries were detected attempting to irregularly enter the EU, whereby the majority are likely to have used smugglers.

103 UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

Below are estimates of the total potential income of smuggling along selected routes in a six-year period:¹⁰⁴

Fig. 9 Estimated gross income on selected routes from GLO.ACT partner countries to Europe (January 2015 - May 2021)

Route	Estimated Gross Income (6 years)	Annual Average Gross Income
Single passage from Türkiye to Greece (land and sea)	\$918 million	\$153 million
		
Complete passage from Türkiye to Western Balkans (land and sea)	\$438 million	\$73 million
		

Note: Fees reported to UNODC were paid for multiple modes (land and sea) of transport. The two routes reported here include the following: 1) passage from Türkiye to Greece, where the client paid only for the journey between these two countries and 2) the complete passage from Türkiye to any of the countries in the Western Balkans, where the client paid for the journey from Türkiye, through Greece, and into different countries of the Western Balkans (Bulgaria included).

These routes were matched as closely as possible to routes used by Frontex in reporting people from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan detected as attempting irregular entry between January 2015 and May 2021 – a similar period of time in which the fees were reported. For these calculations, it is assumed that all those detected attempting irregular entry to the EU used and paid for smuggling services, although in reality only a proportion – albeit high – of them did.

Fees reported about journeys from Türkiye to Greece are matched alongside the Eastern Mediterranean routes by land and sea (n=487,906). The average fee reported in 22 interviews and cases is \$1,881 per smuggling incident. When 487,906 is multiplied by 1,881, the total gross income for all smuggling along the route is \$917,751,186.

Fees reported about journeys from Türkiye to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria are matched alongside the Western Balkans route by land (n=122,885). The average fee reported in seven interviews and cases is \$3,564 per smuggling incident. When 122,885 is multiplied by 3,564, the total gross income for all smuggling along the route accounts for \$437,962,140.

These calculations are rough estimates and should not be considered as precise and absolute, as information about variations in route, mode of transportation, client profile and smuggler profile are largely unavailable. Therefore, these figures should be considered as conservative estimates.

Certain limitations to these calculations should be taken into account. Firstly, it is difficult to determine what proportion of people from the three countries attempting irregular entry into the EU were smuggled.¹⁰⁵ Secondly, not all smuggling cases/irregular entries are detected. In addition, these figures only refer to entries by land and sea, and not by air.

Furthermore, the fees charged by smugglers vary according to the services provided and can fluctuate due to increases and slumps in demand, unexpected logistical challenges and increased surveillance, amongst other factors. In addition, smugglers may add additional charges along the route or once the destination is reached. For example, in a case recorded by the European Commission in 2015, people

¹⁰⁴ Based on fees reported in interviews and cases collected by UNODC.

¹⁰⁵ UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

smuggled from Bangladesh were told the cost of the trip from I.R. of Iran to Greece would be €2,000, but when they arrived in Istanbul, Türkiye, the smuggler demanded another €4,000 for onward travel to Greece.¹⁰⁶

According to Frontex, a total of 184,323 attempts at irregular entries into the EU by people from the four GLO.ACT partner countries were recorded in the five years between January 2018 and December 2022.¹⁰⁷ According to Europol and Interpol, more than 90 per cent of irregular entries into the EU are facilitated by smugglers.¹⁰⁸ Thus, based on the detection of irregular entry attempts, it can be estimated that nearly 166,000 were smuggling incidents.

The numbers behind smuggling by air are more difficult to ascertain. In 2021, Frontex recorded 31,025 refusals of entry at air borders into the EU, due to a range of reasons, including fraudulent documents and invalid visas.¹⁰⁹ Some of these people may have been smuggled, though only a very small proportion are from GLO.ACT partner countries.

From 2018 to 2021, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea route was the route most commonly used by people from GLO.ACT partner countries to irregularly enter the EU.⁷² However, in 2022, the Western Balkans land route became the most popular for people from GLO.ACT partner countries. This route involves refugees and migrants leaving Türkiye, traveling first through Greece or Bulgaria, then exiting the EU and traveling through North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and/or Albania before re-entering the EU via Hungary, Croatia, or Romania. The Central Mediterranean route was the second most commonly used route during this period.¹¹¹

The majority of payments have therefore been destined for smugglers based in transit countries along the Eastern Mediterranean route, the Western Balkans route, and since 2022, the Central Mediterranean route.

106 European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, "A study on smuggling of migrants: Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries", (Brussels, 2015).

107 Frontex, "Detections of Illegal Border-Crossing Statistics", FRAN and JORA Databases. Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed on 17 February 2023).

108 Europol and Interpol, "Migrant Smuggling Networks", Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2016), p. 4.


109 This compares to 26,628 refusals of entry at air borders during 2020, and 62,859 in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing reduction in air travel worldwide; Frontex, *Risk Analysis for 2022/2023* (Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020).

110 Frontex dataset on Detections of Illegal Border Crossings Statistics, available at https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Migratory_routes/2023/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_20230302.xlsx (accessed on 6 April 2023).

111 Frontex, "Detections of Illegal Border-Crossing Statistics", FRAN and JORA Databases. Available at <https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/> (accessed on 17 February 2023).

Fig. 10 Other routes from GLO.ACT partner countries to the EU

**People arriving irregularly
in the EU from GLO.ACT partner countries,
by nationality and route (January 2018-December 2022)**





COVID-19 AND IFFS ASSOCIATED WITH SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS

Closed borders, visa restrictions and increased immigration controls all caused shifts in both smuggling demand and the *modus operandi* of smugglers. In many cases, it caused higher demand for smuggling services due to fewer economic opportunities in countries of origin and greater entry and visa restrictions in countries of destination. In field research during 2020, covering 1,419 people using smugglers in four regions, half of all respondents noted that smugglers' fees had increased since the beginning of the pandemic.ⁱ

Border closures and increased surveillance often result in the use of riskier routes and more dangerous conditions.ⁱⁱ In the same study, over 60 per cent of respondents stated that since the beginning of the pandemic, smugglers have started using more dangerous routes.ⁱⁱⁱ Also prior to the pandemic, more dangerous routes resulted in smugglers charging higher fees.^{iv} Smugglers were often obliged to pay fees to criminal groups and law enforcement in order to smuggle people through specific territories or areas that they did not use for transit prior to the pandemic.^v

While the impacts of COVID-19 may in some cases have prompted people to postpone or cancel their migration plans, people fleeing conflict and persecution do not have that option. With fewer options for movement, desperation can lead to abuse, exploitation, trafficking and the need to use costlier and riskier smuggling services.^{vi}

Finally, the higher prices demanded by smugglers have the potential to change the payment modalities used. Higher prices are likely to engender an increase in "pay as you go" or "travel now pay later" payment structures. Smuggling clients may be forced to work along the way or once at the destination to repay their debts, which increases their vulnerability and risk to exploitation.^{vii}

While increased fees would lead to an increase in IFFs, the decrease in smuggler availability and controls on migration should have the opposite effect. However, stricter border controls could lead smuggling clients to make far more attempts than previously and thus increase smuggler revenue.^{viii}

i Mixed Migration Centre, COVID-19 Global Thematic Update #1 – 1 September 2020: Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020).

ii United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, How COVID-19 restrictions and the economic consequences are likely to impact migrant smuggling and cross-border trafficking in persons to Europe and North America (Vienna, Austria, 2020).

iii Mixed Migration Centre, COVID-19 Global Thematic Update #1 – 1 September 2020: Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Smuggling (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020), p. 1.

iv Tuesday Reitano, "What Pricing Tells Us About the Nature of the Smuggling Business," The New Humanitarian, June 9, 2017, <https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/refugees/community/2017/06/09/what-pricing-tells-us-about-the-nature-of-the-smuggling-business>.

v Gabriella Sanchez and Luigi Achilli, "Stranded: The Impacts of COVID-19 on Irregular Migration and Migrant Smuggling", Robert Schuman Centre Policy Briefs (2020).

vi United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, How COVID-19 restrictions and the economic consequences are likely to impact migrant smuggling and cross-border trafficking in persons to Europe and North America (Vienna, Austria, 2020).

vii Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Smuggling in the Time of COVID-19: The impact of the pandemic on human-smuggling dynamics and migrant-protection risks (Geneva, Switzerland, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2020).

viii Lucia Bird, "Learning from COVID-19: Implications for the EU Response to Human Smuggling", IAI Commentaries, vol. 20, No. 92 (December 2020).

2.5. IFFs associated with Smuggling Costs

Costs incurred in committing smuggling offences include, among others, transportation (drivers, fuel, vehicle purchase/rental/maintenance), provision of accommodation, payments to guides and other smuggling associates, equipment for forging documents, and bribes. As with fees, the costs incurred vary according to routes, origins, destinations, services offered and modes of transportation. An Iraqi humanitarian aid worker described the different costs that smugglers need to cover:

*"I would say if he's travelling by his car, then fuel is included. If he has to provide that accommodation and the accommodation is included, if he's involved in a network, which is usually the case, then he has to divide the amount between other smugglers as well, who are at either the other side of the border, that is the main smuggler who's managing the whole operation and everyone else who are involved. On the other side of the borders, he would have to pay also the authorities, like the border guards, who are involved in this, if they have to cross through the border and enter the country."*¹¹²

Due to the likelihood that many of these costs and transfers of "salaries" to associates involve cross-border transactions, the payment of costs by smugglers also generates significant IFFs.

Prosecutors interviewed in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that smugglers:

*"Mostly spend their earnings paying for accommodation, if they came to the Western Balkans....so one part goes to them, then they share the earnings with the helpers, etc. So far, we have not had information that they are buying real estate, [or] cars. It mostly comes down to paying [for] accommodation or food for other migrants who will be smuggled".*¹¹³

Approaches such as overcrowding of boats used to smuggle people from Türkiye to the EU, and using old, cheap, and poorly maintained vessels, are attempts on the smugglers' part to lower the costs incurred and maximize profits.¹¹⁴ In an interview conducted by UNODC in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a prosecutor commented:

*"We noticed that [the smugglers] realized if it was their own vehicle, that vehicle would surely be confiscated. When the rental car agency is in question, or a third party, the vehicles are returned to the owners. Then, even if they have their own, they rent other vehicles. Even if they are detected, the vehicle will be returned to the owner. There is another thing in newer cases. They take cars that do not have legal plates, and find [legal] plates and they carry out [the] transports, so even if they are stopped, that does not cause much damage to the budget".*¹¹⁵

Case 8

SMUGGLING COSTS

In a case of smuggling by land from Türkiye to Sofia, Bulgaria through Greece, the organizer of the smuggling group made between €10,000 and €13,000 per trip from a group of four to five clients. For each trip, the organizer

spent €1,000 for the vehicle, €500 for the guide and €200 for the person who bought the vehicle.

Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, *A study on smuggling of migrants Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries* (Brussels, Belgium, European Commission, 2015).



¹¹² Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

¹¹³ Interview with BOS_05.KII, prosecutors, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.

¹¹⁴ European Commission, Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, "A study on smuggling of migrants: Characteristics, responses and cooperation with third countries", (Brussels, 2015).

¹¹⁵ Interview with BOS_06.KII, prosecutors, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.

A recent investigation by Europol revealed that documents stolen by organized criminal pickpocketing groups in certain European tourist areas were modified and sold online by smugglers based in Greece and Türkiye and sent via parcel services to clients in various countries.¹¹⁶ This constitutes four distinct IFFs:

- The movement across borders of illegally obtained products (travel documents) from tourist areas to Greece and Türkiye as inward IFFs;
- The payment of the pickpocketing group by smugglers in Greece and Türkiye as outward IFFs;

- The shipping across borders of the stolen travel documents to the clients to the transit or origin countries as inward IFFs; and
- The payment by the clients from the transit or origin countries to the smugglers for the illegally obtained and illegally modified travel documents as outward IFFs.

However, both in the case of SOM and TIP, a significant proportion of cases remain undetected.¹¹⁷ This makes it difficult to estimate the total costs, proceeds and exchanges of value, and, by extension, what proportion of that is cross-border and comprises the related IFFs.

KEY FINDINGS RELATING TO ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS ASSOCIATED WITH SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS

Key Finding 5

Illicit financial flows associated with smuggling of migrants arise from the cross-border transfer of:

- Payments by refugees and migrants who use smuggling services;
- Expenses for costs borne by smugglers;
- “Salaries” between different members of a smuggling group; and
- Crime proceeds issuing from smuggling of migrants, such as through investing or money laundering.

Key Finding 6

The volume and directions of IFFs associated with smuggling often depend on the scale at which the smugglers operate. Smuggling of migrants is committed by a wide spectrum of perpetrators, ranging from local, independent, and opportunistic smugglers; small groups collaborating in a business arrangement; and to large, structured transnational crime organizations. The high-level organizers of migrant smuggling may be based anywhere – in the countries of origin, transit, or destination of their clients, as well as in other countries.

IFFs relating to the costs of committing the smuggling offences also vary greatly according to routes, origins, destinations, services offered and modes of transportation.

116 European Migrant Smuggling Centre, “EMSC 4th Annual Activity Report 2020”, (The Hague, The Netherlands, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2020). Among the countries considered for the study, based on the frequency of use of fraudulent documents in the EU, the largest profits are made from Iraqis, followed by Afghans and Pakistanis in smaller, similar shares.

117 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

Key Finding 7

Smugglers may operate seemingly legitimate travel and labour recruitment agencies. Thus, financial flows resulting from the smuggling activity can be registered as legal income of legitimate businesses, making the related IFFs even more difficult to detect. If the operation uses a legitimate business as a front, IFFs may be recorded, processed, and transferred together with legal funds.

Key Finding 8

The IFFs associated with comprehensive smuggling packages, which facilitates smuggling to more distant destinations in a relatively short time, involve flows of larger sums of money due to the higher prices involved. Smugglers dealing in high-quality fraudulent documents can also charge a significant markup. However, as such packages are inaccessible for many potential clients due to the high cost, this type of smuggling-related IFFs is less common than other types.

In the marketplace form of smuggling, wherein the smuggling services are offered in a competing marketplace-type setup, IFFs involving smaller sums move between refugees' and migrants' countries of origin, smuggling hubs in transit countries, and the centres of economic interest of smugglers.

In many cases, clients of smuggling make relatively small cash payments for individual services to opportunistic actors. As this commonly takes place in transit countries, and the clients usually have their centre of economic interest in the origin countries, these payments constitute IFFs albeit on a very small scale.

Key Finding 9

A total of 184,323 attempts at irregular entries into the EU by people from the four GLO.ACT partner countries were recorded during the five years between January 2018 and December 2022. Around 90 per cent of these attempts are estimated to have been facilitated by smugglers. Thus, based on the detection of irregular entry attempts, it can be estimated that nearly 166,000 were smuggling incidents. The routes on which people from GLO.ACT partner countries have most frequently been identified in recent years are the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean routes.

CHAPTER 3

Illicit Financial Flows associated with Trafficking in Persons


3.1. Trafficking in persons context in GLO.ACT partner countries

The different trafficking actors, forms of exploitation and victim profiles crucially influence the size, modalities and directions of illicit financial flows associated with trafficking in persons (TIP).


Information on victim profiles and forms of exploitation is limited for the countries considered in this Study. However, nationals who have been trafficked from GLO.ACT partner countries are among the most commonly detected nationalities in Western and Southern Europe, particularly in the UK, Finland, Türkiye and Italy.¹¹⁸

Fig. 11 Detected Afghan, Iraqi and Pakistani victims of trafficking in Europe¹¹⁹

Detected Victims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan in Western and Southern Europe, by country of detection (2016-2018, or most recent) (numbers)



Detected Victims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan in Western and Southern Europe, by country of detection (2016-2018, or most recent) (proportions)



In the South Asian subregion, which includes data from Afghanistan and Pakistan, women (43%) and boys (24%) make up the majority of victims detected by the authorities, followed by men (20%) and girls (13%).¹²⁰ The data on detected victims suggests limited inward IFFs associated with TIP. Ninety-nine per cent of all victims of trafficking detected in South Asia that were reported to UNODC were trafficked internally, that is within their own country of citizenship. However, there are indications of outward IFFs associated with human trafficking, as an increasing number of victims from South Asian countries were detected in East Asia and the Pacific, Western

and Southern Europe, and North America between 2017 and 2020.¹²¹

In the Middle Eastern subregion, which includes Iraq, women make up the vast majority of detected victims (87%). There is a far smaller share of men (12%) and child victims (1%) identified as trafficking victims.¹²² Victims trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation are identified in roughly equal proportions in the Middle East. Sixty-three per cent of foreign victims identified in the subregion were from other subregional countries, followed by 14 per cent from East Asia.¹²³ However, information on

118 Based on official national data from 21 countries reported to UNODC for the Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons 2018 and 2020.

119 Source: UNODC elaboration on official national data.

120 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1). The South Asia region includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

121 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

122 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1). The "other countries of the Middle East" sub-region includes Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen.

123 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

detected victims only represents a part of the picture since undetected victims may be trafficked to other destinations.

In certain cases, where payments and profits related to committing trafficking offences are transferred into and out of the country, internal trafficking can also involve IFFs. Field research conducted in Afghanistan suggests that internal trafficking particularly affects women and children.¹²⁴ Afghan women and girls are at risk of various forms of exploitation, particularly forced marriage.¹²⁵ Some parents force their daughters into “pleasure marriages” (temporary marriages that facilitate sexual exploitation¹²⁶), in addition to subjecting them to practices known as *baad* and *baadal* which make girls and women particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Particularly in areas where rule of law is weak,¹²⁷ families may use daughters as a tool to resolve conflict by giving a daughter to another family (*baad*) or by exchanging daughters instead of something of physical or financial value, to reduce dowry costs (*baadal*).¹²⁸

Interviews conducted in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2017 revealed that trafficking for forced and bonded labour, and to a lesser extent for exploitative begging, as well as sexual exploitation, are highly prevalent.¹²⁹ A specific form of sexual exploitation of boys — *bacha bazi* or “dancing boys” — often consti-

tutes a form of TIP.¹³⁰ Boys are trafficked in collusion with their parents: “boys from poor families may be sold in exchange for food, clothing or money”.¹³¹ The UN has also verified the use and exploitation of Afghan boys in armed conflict.¹³²

For cross-border trafficking from Afghanistan, the profiles of victims and forms of exploitation vary according to the country of destination. Afghan men and boys are often trafficked to the I.R. of Iran and exploited in domestic servitude and agriculture, or subjected to other forms of forced labour. Afghan girls and women, on the other hand, are often trafficked to Pakistan and primarily exploited in domestic servitude.¹³³

In Iraq, TIP committed by organized criminal groups is prevalent. One method involves criminal groups kidnapping victims, mainly women and girls, and trafficking them to neighbouring countries for sexual exploitation.¹³⁴ Sometimes this is done through the aforementioned method of “pleasure marriages”. A second method is to disguise trafficking for sexual exploitation under the façade of seemingly legitimate nightclubs, massage parlours and spa businesses.¹³⁵ A representative of an Iraqi NGO, interviewed for this research, commented that traffickers use “*recruiting agencies for labour [in] the massage centres, so therefore they are under the name of [a] massage [business]*”.¹³⁶

124 Suparva Narasimhaiah, A Mapping Study: Institutional Mechanisms to Tackle Trafficking in Persons in Afghanistan (Ontario, Canada, Security Governance Group, 2017).

125 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

126 Interview with IRA_32_KII, nongovernmental organizations, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 10 March 2021.

127 International Organization for Migration, “Afghanistan Migration Profile”, (Kabul, Afghanistan, International Organization for Migration Afghanistan, 2014).

128 Samuel Hall, *Old Practice, New Chains: Modern Slavery in Afghanistan, A Study of Human Trafficking from 2003-2013* (Kabul, Afghanistan, International Organization for Migration, 2013).

129 Suparva Narasimhaiah, A Mapping Study: Institutional Mechanisms to Tackle Trafficking in Persons in Afghanistan (Ontario, Canada, Security Governance Group, 2017).

130 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018*, Booklet 2: Trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict (United Nations Publication, 2018), p. 23; referencing United Nations Security Council, 2015, Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, S/2015/336, paras 18.

131 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018*, Booklet 2: Trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict (United Nations Publication, 2018), p. 23, referencing United Nations Security Council, 2015, Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, S/2015/336, paras 18.

132 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

133 Suparva Narasimhaiah, A Mapping Study: Institutional Mechanisms to Tackle Trafficking in Persons in Afghanistan (Ontario, Canada, Security Governance Group, 2017).

134 ICMPD, *Targeting Vulnerabilities: The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons, A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq* (Vienna, Austria, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2015).

135 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021; Interview with IRA_32_KII, nongovernmental organizations, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 10 March 2021.

136 Interview with IRA_32_KII, nongovernmental organizations, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 10 March 2021.

Forced labour of Iraqis and foreign nationals is reported to national authorities.¹³⁷ In an interview with UNODC an Iraqi law enforcement official indicated that criminal groups committed various forms of trafficking, including exploitative begging and organ removal:

"Also, [the traffickers use] kids for begging in the street... most of the cases are regarding the trafficking of human organs, selling and buying...there are groups, criminals, that are dealing in this here in Iraq...also trafficking in new-born babies."¹³⁸

Pakistani authorities recorded 30 offences of TIP between 2019 and 2021. The majority of trafficking victims detected were Pakistani nationals, and included 26 men, 11 children, and 5 women.¹³⁹ A specific form of trafficking that exists in Pakistan is labour exploitation in brick kilns and mining operations. Criminal networks lure young people from rural areas searching for better economic opportunities to urban areas by offering them cash advances in the form of

loans under the *peshgi* system, with high interest rates and manipulation of debt repayment.¹⁴⁰ Wages are low for victims working in brick kilns and mining operations, who may be trapped in a cycle of debt that is often intergenerational, with their children also being forced to start working at a very young age. This is especially the case in brick kilns.¹⁴¹

There are approximately 152,700 active brick kilns in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. They employ over 16 million people, making over a fifth (21%) of the world's bricks. A significant proportion of these 16 million people are trafficked for labour exploitation.¹⁴²



IFFS ASSOCIATED WITH SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN GLO.ACT PARTNER COUNTRIES

The involvement of non-state armed groups in trafficking in persons, including terrorist and violent extremist groups, has been found to generate revenue, though it is not as significant a source of income as other criminal activities. This may involve trafficking for exploitation in armed conflict and auxiliary activities, forced labour in mineral extraction, or sexual exploitation in prostitution in many regions around the world.ⁱ

When the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled large parts of Iraq, members of the group subjected men and boys to forced labour on sheep and poultry farms, while women and girls were sold at slave markets for revenue.ⁱⁱ Examples from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan of non-state armed groups using trafficking to generate income include

exploitation of children in street begging,ⁱⁱⁱ removal and sale of organs^{iv} and the sale of women and girls as "commodities".^v

Some of the transactions related to forced labour and the selling of people have cross-border implications, as they are transferred between people with economic centres of interest in different countries. Furthermore, some of the proceeds constitute IFFs.

There is less evidence as to whether and in what ways non-state armed groups use smuggling of migrants to generate revenue in the Middle East and South Asia. The main form of revenue linked to smuggling is generated not from smuggling itself, but from imposing protection/transit fees on smugglers who are operating on territory controlled

137 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

138 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

139 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022*, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1

140 Fraser Murray and others, *Modern Slavery in Pakistan: Final Report* (London, United Kingdom, DAI, 2019).

141 National Initiative Against Organized Crime Pakistan, *Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Pakistan*, (Islamabad, Pakistan, 2020).

142 See findings for indications of labour trafficking in brick kilns in Pakistan: ILO (2022). *A study of deficits in the fundamental principles and rights at work in the brick kiln supply chain*. ILO.

by such groups. In Syria, for instance, smugglers pay various non-state armed groups in order to operate.^{vi} Turkish smugglers reportedly “rented” a specific portion of the border in half-hour segments from non-state armed groups and terrorists to facilitate the movement of people.^{vii} Some of these transactions may constitute IFFs, though they are

not directly associated with perpetrating the crime of SOM.

In a focus group formed for this Study, humanitarian aid workers in Iraq indicated that the taxes and fees levied on smugglers substantially increase the prices to be paid to cross relatively small areas, particularly if those being smuggled are women:

“Like maybe \$5,000 or \$6,000 for an individual, because...especially for women who were fleeing the area alone, they have to provide a document from the Sharia Court enter the [group’s territory]. So, the smuggler was responsible for providing them with these documents”.^{viii}

i United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, Booklet 2: Trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict (United Nations Publication, 2018).

ii United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, *Identifying and Exploring the Nexus Between Human Trafficking, Terrorism, and Terrorism Financing* (New York City, New York, 2018).

iii United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, Booklet 2: Trafficking in persons in the context of armed conflict (United Nations Publication, 2018), p. 23, referencing United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, on her mission to Jordan.

iv Ibid, referencing United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016, Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, on her mission to Jordan, Paras 19-20.

v Ibid, referencing United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, *They came to destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis*, A/HRC/32/CRP.2.

vi Luigi Achilli and Allesandro Tinti, “Debunking the Smuggler-Terrorist Nexus: Human Smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 41 (October 2019).

vii Luigi Achilli and Allesandro Tinti, “Debunking the Smuggler-Terrorist Nexus: Human Smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 41 (October 2019).

viii Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), February 2021.

3.2. Trafficking Actors

There are four main categories of actors involved in trafficking in and from GLO.ACT partner countries (note that categories can overlap, and one person may have more than one role, e.g., recruiter and exploiter):

The victim is the person who is exploited to generate income for the trafficker. If the transactions related to this income have a cross-border element, then an IFF is generated. In addition, if the victim is “sold,” then this may generate an IFF.

The recruiter is the person involved in the first stage of the trafficking process. Recruiters may use employment and travel agencies, family and friendship connections, deception, force or coercion, abducting victims or threatening victims and their families with harm.¹⁴³ As information and communications technology (ICT) becomes more widespread, recruiters also use online platforms to advertise deceptive job offers and market exploitative services. However, this is less common in GLO.ACT partner countries.¹⁴⁴ If the recruiter has their centre of economic interest in a different country than other members of the trafficking network, then salaries and expenses may be transferred to the recruiter from a different country, constituting an IFF.

The exploiter is involved in the stage of exploitation¹⁴⁵ and directly receives income from the exploitation of victims. This income may itself have a cross-border element and may also be transferred by the exploiter to other members of the network, generating IFFs. In addition, like the recruiter, the exploiter may receive salaries and expenses from members

of the network with their centre of economic interest in another country.

As discussed above, families may contribute to girls and women being trafficked for the purposes of “pleasure marriages,” to resolve dowry costs,¹⁴⁶ or exploit victims in domestic servitude. Particularly in Pakistan prospective domestic workers may engage in informal networking to find employment.¹⁴⁷ In such domestic trafficking cases, where all actors have their center of economic interest in one country, no IFFs are generated.

The customer is the end consumer of the product or service generated or provided through exploitation. The end customer thus directly or indirectly pays the exploiter. IFFs are generated when the customer has their centre of economic interest in a different country to the exploiter or any intermediaries involved in the transaction.

It is important to note that trafficking in persons (TIP) may involve other actors, such as transporters or those harbouring victims, as well as corrupt officials, who are often also involved in facilitating aspects of TIP, such as refraining from raiding locations of exploitation (e.g. brothels, mining sites, brick kilns) or issuing travel documents or work permits to victims who do not fulfil the requirements.¹⁴⁸ In an interview conducted by UNODC for this Study, an Iraqi law enforcement official detailed a bribery scheme through which Filipina women were trafficked into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The trafficker organized for the women to enter Iraq on tourist visas, before paying US\$100 to corrupt officials to issue work permits,¹⁴⁹ generating an IFF from the trafficker based outside Iraq to officials in Iraq.

143 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020*, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3).

144 Ibid.

145 Forms as listed in Art. 3, para (a), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

146 International Organization for Migration, *Afghanistan Migration Profile* (Kabul, Afghanistan, International Organization for Migration Afghanistan, 2014), p. 112; Samuel Hall, *Old Practice, New Chains: Modern Slavery in Afghanistan, A Study of Human Trafficking from 2003-2013* (Kabul, Afghanistan, International Organization for Migration, 2013), p.17.

147 Fraser Murray and others, *Modern Slavery in Pakistan: Final Report* (London, United Kingdom, DAI, 2019), p. 12; UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020*, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3), p. 46.

148 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Analysing the Business Model of Trafficking in Human Beings to Better Prevent the Crime*, (Vienna, Austria, 2010), p. 57.

149 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

A wide array of trafficker profiles are documented with evidence, ranging from small groups to international criminal networks and spanning across various regions. Traffickers may be from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds and may receive logistical support from a broad range of actors, including government officials.¹⁵⁰ While different trafficking operations often share many characteristics (e.g., a focus on profits), they do not follow a single business model.

3.3. International vs. Domestic Trafficking

There is an important distinction to be made between domestic trafficking and cross-border trafficking with regard to IFFs. Domestic trafficking is less likely to generate IFFs unless the perpetrator, victim or other actors involved – such as buyers of sexual services, prospective spouses in the case of forced marriage, or labour intermediaries – have their centres of economic interest outside the country, or the proceeds are laundered abroad.

Globally speaking, most trafficking victims are detected in their countries of citizenship. For instance, in 2020, 60 per cent of all detected victims of trafficking were identified within their own country of citizenship.¹⁵¹ Nonetheless, countries in Western and Southern Europe record sizable shares of trafficking victims coming from other regions, including the countries covered in this Study.¹⁵²

With regard to cross-border trafficking, a significant number of victims from the GLO.ACT region are detected in Europe. Between 2016 and 2018, a total of 341 victims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan

were detected in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom.¹⁵³ The actual number of people from these regions being trafficked to Europe is likely to be much higher, as many victims remain undetected.¹⁵⁴ Such cross-border trafficking cases generate IFFs both to and from the origin and destination countries, as well as transit countries and other countries whether the actors involved have their centres of economic interest.

Groups specialized in recruiting victims make income by “selling” victims. The price at which they are sold depends on the group’s ability to negotiate the monetary value of each victim,¹⁵⁵ as well as the sale potentially involving a cross-border element. However, income generated during the recruitment phase is generally considered minor compared to the income generated during the exploitation phase of trafficking.¹⁵⁶ For example, non-governmental organizations in Iraq interviewed for this Study highlighted that Syrian, Iraqi Yazidi and other Iraqi women and girls were sold “under temporary marriage...pleasure marriage...but even marriage as a cover for prostitution.” Iraqi Kurdish women were also transferred to the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait “under the name of marriage...and the [traffickers] give some money to the family.”¹⁵⁷

3.4. IFFs associated with Trafficking Income

Women and girls sold for sexual exploitation, are sold at lower price points in GLO.ACT partner countries than in Europe, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other economies. The figure below, based on anecdotal evidence, illustrates some of these differences, in the three countries and further afield.

150 Data provided by Member States to UNODC for the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020.

151 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022, (United Nations Publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1).

152 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.19.IV.2).

153 Data provided by Member States to UNODC for the Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020.

154 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Multiple Systems Estimation for estimating the number of victims of human trafficking across the world (Vienna, 2016). Multiple Systems Estimation (MSE) has the potential of being “an alternative, efficient method of estimating the number of non-detected numbers of victims of trafficking in persons in a country. In short, the MSE methodology utilizes existing lists of victims of trafficking by different authorities or NGOs and on the basis of a statistical methodology based on the concept of the capture-recapture method the ‘dark figure’ of victims that are not included on any list is estimated by analysing the overlaps between the lists”.

155 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3).

156 UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3).

157 Interview with IRA_32_KII, NGOs, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 10 March 2021.

Fig. 12 Indicative monetary value exchange between the trafficker and recruiter for victims of sexual exploitation

Victims Origin	Age profile	Location of "Sale"	Price per victim	Reference Year
Iraq ¹⁵⁸	11-15	Iraq	\$800–\$3,600	2015
Iraq ¹⁵⁹	11-15	Outside Iraq	about \$6,000	2015
Southeast Asia ¹⁶⁰	Adults	Iraq	\$3,000-\$4,000	2021
Pakistan ¹⁶¹	Adults	Pakistan	\$1,000-\$1,300	2020
Southeast Asia ¹⁶²	Adults	Southeast Asia	\$2,000-\$3,000	2016-2018
Southeast Asia ¹⁶³	Adults	Australia/Japan	\$10,000-\$15,000	2016-2018

Between 2007 and 2017, 15 countries in six regions reported the monetary value exchange between traffickers when recruiting a victim to the UNODC.¹⁶⁴ Some of these transactions involved relatively small amounts of money, with trafficked girls and women being sold for as little as \$36, yet in other cases for as much as \$23,600.¹⁶⁵

As outlined above, the global number of detected victims of trafficking in persons only represents a small portion of the actual number of victims.¹⁶⁶ Detected victims represent only the tip of the iceberg, as many victims remain undetected.¹⁶⁷ One approach

for estimating the number of undetected victims is the Multiple Systems Estimations (MSE), which has been applied in certain European countries.¹⁶⁸ To derive the number of undetected victims based on the number of detected victims, a multiplier for each country was determined. These multipliers are used to estimate the actual number of victims from the countries focused on in this Study in selected destination countries.

158 Claire Healy and others, *Targeting Vulnerabilities: The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons, A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq* (Vienna, Austria, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2015).

159 Claire Healy and others, *Targeting Vulnerabilities: The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons, A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq* (Vienna, Austria, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2015).

160 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

161 National Initiative Against Organized Crime Pakistan, *Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Pakistan*, (Islamabad, Pakistan, 2020).

162 UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2020*, (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.20.IV.3).

163 Ibid.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid, this includes national statistics that are periodically collected by international organizations such as UNODC and Eurostat. These statistics as the basis for the biannual Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons, see www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/global-report-on-trafficking-in-persons.html.

167 Consequently, the actual number of victims cannot be observed but only be estimated through statistical techniques. Some guidance on how to best estimate the full extent can be found in SDG indicator 16.2.2; Number of victims of trafficking in persons per 100,000 population, by sex, age and form of exploitation See www.unodc.org/documents/research/UNODC-DNR_research_brief.pdf.

168 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Violence against Children, *Monitoring Target 16.2 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals A multiple systems estimation of the numbers of presumed human trafficking victims in the Netherlands in 2010-2015 by year, age, gender, form of exploitation and nationality*, (2015).

For example, there were 270 trafficking victims from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan detected in United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands from 2016 to 2018 (or most recent). Using

the MSE method, it can be estimated that there are approximately 930 to 1,350 victims of trafficking from Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan in these countries.¹⁶⁹



VULNERABILITY OF SMUGGLED MIGRANTS TO ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION

Due to their dependency on smugglers as well as their isolation along dangerous and often un-monitored routes, smuggled people are vulnerable to abuse by smugglers and other actors. A 2015-2016 survey conducted among people travelling along the Eastern Mediterranean Route to Europe found that around seven per cent of the respondents had experienced at least one exploitative practice during their journey.ⁱ In 2020, 38 per cent of 665 Afghans surveyed in a study conducted by the Mixed Migration Centre indicated that smugglers were the most likely perpetrators of violence or persons responsible for dangerous incidents along the journey.ⁱⁱ

Delayed payments often incentivize smugglers to ensure their clients' well-being and safe arrival. If payments are made in advance, however, there is less incentive for smugglers to refrain from exploitative and abusive behaviour.ⁱⁱⁱ In a case reported by Greek authorities, two Greek smugglers facilitated the transportation, irregular entry, and provision of accommodation of 48 Afghans, Iranians, Iraqis and others, from Türkiye to Greece.^{iv} In Greece, the smugglers locked them into their accommodation, with limited space and food, and used physical violence

and death threats to extort money from them in exchange for their release.^v

In smuggling, large debts may be contracted, significantly increasing the risk of exploitation and often incentivising trafficking.^{vi} For instance, in a case coordinated by Europol prior to 2015, Pakistanis paid €14,000 per person for transportation across the Western Mediterranean route into the EU.^{vii} Once they arrived in Spain, however, the organized criminal group that perpetrated the smuggling forced them to work in a network of restaurants to repay their debts for transportation and the provision of fraudulent documents.^{viii} Profits generated from this exploitation were invested into new restaurants or sent to Pakistan via wire transfers,^{ix} generating IFFs. It should be noted that this predates the entry into force of Pakistan's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the completion of its action plans. Pakistan, which is Compliant or Largely Compliant with 38 out of 40 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, is now in the top tier of technically compliant countries as assessed by the FATF^x and has been removed from the FATF grey list.^{xi}

i International Organization for Migration MENA Regional Office and Altai Consulting, *Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots*, June 2015, p. 44.

ii Mixed Migration Centre, MMC Europe 4Mi Snapshot – April 2021: Smuggling dynamics for Afghans on the move towards Europe (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020), p. 5.

iii Jørgen Carling, Anne T. Gallagher and Christopher Horwood (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat), "Beyond Definitions Global migration and the smuggling–trafficking nexus", (November 2015); *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations publication, 2018).

iv The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), *Aeios Pagos 1025/2008*, UNODC Case No. GRCx037, 15 April 2008. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

v Ibid.

169 The MSE methods work by calculating a victimization rate per 100,000 population before disaggregating data further into victim profile, form of exploitation and trafficking flow (domestic vs. cross-border). Thus far, UNODC, in conjunction with the national authorities of respective countries, has carried out four MSE studies in trafficking in persons in the Netherlands, Ireland, Romania, and Serbia. In these studies, the results revealed that, using the MSE method, it was likely that the number of actual victims in the Netherlands in one year was four to five times higher than the number of detected victims. In Ireland and Romania, this figure was determined to be four times higher than the number of detected victims, while in Serbia it was somewhere between four and nine times higher. The number of victims reported to UNODC by Member States was then multiplied by the range used for the MSE study for that particular reporting country, if available. If unavailable, the average range (between four and five times higher than actual victims) was used based on the studies carried out by UNODC in The Netherlands, Ireland, Romania and Serbia. Therefore, these calculations should be considered limited. For the United Kingdom, the range of three to five times higher than actual victims is used, as the Home Office applied this figure in 2014 (see Bernard Silverman, *Modern Slavery: an application of Multiple Systems Estimation* (London, United Kingdom, Home Office, 2014). For Finland, no MSE study has been carried out in the country, thus the range of four and five is used. Similarly, for Italy and for Norway, multiplying it by four and five results in 80. A MSE study was carried out in the Netherlands, finding that the estimated number of trafficking victims is between four and five times higher than that detected (see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The Dutch National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Human Beings and Sexual Violence against Children, Monitoring Target 16.2 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals).

vi UNODC, *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018* (United Nations Publication, Sales No. E.18.IV.9).

vii Europol, Situation Report Trafficking in human beings in the EU (The Hague, the Netherlands, The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2015).

viii Ibid.

ix Ibid, p.15.

x See: www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Fur-pakistan-2022.html, accessed 17.02.2023.

xi "The FATF welcomes Pakistan's significant progress in improving its AML/CFT regime. Pakistan has strengthened the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and addressed technical deficiencies to meet the commitments of its action plans regarding strategic deficiencies that the FATF identified in June 2018 and June 2021, the latter of which was completed in advance of the deadlines, encompassing 34 action items in total. Pakistan is therefore no longer subject to the FATF's increased monitoring process." See: www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2022.html#pakistan, accessed 14.12.2022.

3.5. IFFs associated with Income from Exploitation

Higher profits tend to be made in the exploitation phase, as the flow of revenue is continuous rather than one-off. Financial transactions include payments from a customer to the exploiter as well as profits transferred from the exploiter to other members of the trafficking network, the latter of which being more likely to constitute IFFs. However, transfers from the customer to the exploiter may also constitute IFFs, if for example, in the context of sexual exploitation in tourist regions, the exploiter is a resident and the customer is a non-resident.

When used in combination with the estimated number of victims, the prices at which a victim and their services (exploitation) are sold to customers may provide a general understanding of the income generated by traffickers. The income that has a cross-border element provides an indication of the potential size of IFFs associated with income from trafficking.

The prices at which a victim's services and products produced through exploitative labour are sold to customers, depends largely on the form of exploitation and the market in which the transactions take place.

The most profitable forms of exploitation are those that allow traffickers to sell such services repeatedly. For example, a law enforcement official in Iraq described a case in which two women were sexually exploited over a period of time, generating \$200 per day for their exploiter.¹⁷⁰ Trafficking for forced labour and sexual exploitation are the most common forms of trafficking in persons, and provide for repeated profits from continued exploitation.

In cases of trafficking for the purpose of organ removal, the crime proceeds can be very high even though the victims' organ(s) may only be sold once. For example, in one case involving organ removal, a kidney was sold for \$6,300.¹⁷¹

In terms of the markets in which products and services are provided, profits vary greatly depending upon the form of exploitation.¹⁷² Studies show that sexual exploitation in prostitution can result in a return on investment ranging from 100 per cent to 1,000 per cent. Even in less profitable sectors (e.g., agricultural labour in India), an exploited laborer can produce over 50 per cent profit.¹⁷³

170 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

171 Claire Healy and others, Targeting Vulnerabilities: *The Impact of the Syrian War and Refugee Situation on Trafficking in Persons, A Study of Syria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq*, (Vienna, Austria, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2015).

172 Financial Action Task Force, *Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants* (Paris, FATF Secretariat, 2011), referencing statistics from OSCE (2010), Europol (2011) and ILO (2002).

173 Financial Action Task Force, *Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants* (Paris, FATF Secretariat, 2011), referencing statistics from OSCE (2010), Europol (2011) and ILO (2002).

Both in the case of trafficking for sexual exploitation and labour exploitation, cross-border trafficking and cross-border sale of products and services provided through exploitative labour are more lucrative than domestic trafficking and domestic sales. This means that the IFFs generated are significant.

In brick kilns in Pakistan in 2020, the average salary of a labour exploitation victim was around PKR 960 (about US\$6.28) for producing 1,000 bricks.

Approximately half of this salary was retained by the exploiter as part of the debt bondage scheme.¹⁷⁴ In the same year, local news sources reported that kilns were selling 1,000 bricks for RS 14,000 (about US\$186) or higher,¹⁷⁵ with likely much higher mark-ups once the bricks are exported. This generates substantial IFFs, even after operation costs are subtracted.

174 National Initiative Against Organized Crime Pakistan, *Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Pakistan*, (Islamabad, Pakistan, 2020), pp. 8-9.

175 Imran Adnan, "Brick prices soar by 30% ahead of kilns closure", *The Express Tribune*, 5 November 2020, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2271084/brick-prices-soar-by-30-ahead-of-kilns-closure>.

CHAPTER 4

Value Transfer Systems related to Smuggling and Trafficking IFFs

The methods of value transfers of IFFs involved when smuggling migrants or trafficking persons from GLO.ACT partner countries include cash, hawala, and, to a lesser extent, money transfer service providers.¹⁷⁶

The hawala (“transfer/exchange”) system is an informal system of money exchange, in which money is transferred without any actual movement of cash. It is an alternative remittance channel that exists outside of traditional banking systems. Transactions between hawala brokers are heavily based on trust and often do not have a paper trail, thus making it very difficult to monitor.

The hawala system is used often by Afghans. Before departure, Afghans who are being smuggled leave an upfront deposit with a third-party guarantor, who will pay the smuggling fee either entirely or in instalments upon the client reaching certain milestones

en route. A hawaladar in the origin country is given the cash and arranges payment to another hawaladar in a transit or destination country. If the smuggling is unsuccessful, part of the fee is refunded to the smuggling client’s family via the hawaladar. If the smuggling is successful, the client calls that person and tells them that he or she arrived safely and gives instructions to release the money to the smuggler.¹⁷⁷

In an interview with UNODC, an Iraqi humanitarian aid worker stated that:

“The family may not be certain that the smuggler will provide the services a 100 per cent, so they arrange in advance that they will pay the rest of the money once they safely arrive in their destination. And, of course, the smugglers have connections within the country of asylum or the second country that they are smuggled to, for sending the money or the cash or wiring it”.¹⁷⁸

THE HAWALA SYSTEM IN AFGHANISTANⁱ

Hawala is a value transfer system that works without physically or electronically moving money. It is commonly used for a range of financial transactions within, to, and from Afghanistan, its neighbouring countries and other countries in South, Central and West Asia and Africa. The system provides access to financial services, including to those who may not be able to otherwise. In Afghanistan, only an estimated 15 per cent of the population (seven per cent of females and 23 per cent of males) have access to a bank account or mobile-money-service provider in 2017.ⁱⁱ

The hawala system relies on trust and reputation to avoid the risk of defaulting on payment requests.

Hawaladars (brokers) may act as trustees or guarantors on licit and illicit transactions, and may offer credit. While the system historically has not been regulated, there has been a push for regulation in recent years. According to Afghan bank regulations, hawala brokers must hold a valid license issued by Afghanistan’s Central Bank and comply with Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations like formal financial institutions.ⁱⁱⁱ The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) reported an improvement in registration of hawaladars and increasing notifications of suspected cases of money laundering.^{iv}

i Based on information from Financial Action Task Force, *The Role of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers in Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing* (Paris, FATF Secretariat, 2013).

ii World Bank Development Account Indicators, <https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/>

iii This observation predates the Taliban takeover in August 2021.

iv Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA), *Annual Report 2019* (2019).

176 Interview with BOS_05_KII, prosecutors, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.

177 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*, UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 2013, p. 32.

178 Focus group discussion with IRA_035_FGD, humanitarian aid workers, facilitated by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 2 February 2021.

Another predominant method of payment for smuggling is a direct cash payment.¹⁷⁹ A young Afghan man interviewed by UNODC in Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that smugglers only accept cash.¹⁸⁰ This particularly applies to traffickers and smugglers acting in an opportunistic or occasional manner,¹⁸¹ to generate income from exploitation.

Formal money transfer services are less commonly used. Higher-level smuggling organizers, who may be based in third countries, are more likely to use such services. In a case from 2012 reported by authorities in France, an international network of smugglers operating along routes from I.R. Iran to northern Europe arranged their clients' transportation, fraudulent travel documents, and accommodation. Payments made by clients to smugglers and value transfers between smugglers were made by specialized money transfer service providers, or via cash couriers.¹⁸²

Payments using formal money transfer services are sometimes made in small amounts to avoid detection. In another case in France, an Afghan smuggler received payments via money transfer service providers from clients in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but only

in small amounts ranging from €100 to €300.¹⁸³ It should be noted that this predates the entry into force of Pakistan's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, with the completion of its action plans and Pakistan's removal from the Financial Action Taskforce (FATF) grey list, as set out above.¹⁸⁴

An individual smuggling case may be complex, with numerous associated IFFs involving different payment systems and multiple actors. According to Bosnian prosecutors interviewed for this Study, for example:

"The payment system by family members usually goes through the hawala system or they say that this or that migrant needs to be smuggled, has the money and would pay by agreeing again on the amount to be paid. If the migrants pay with the money they received through hawala or [money transfer service provider], then they pay according to a pre-agreed scheme, from stage to stage. If the organizer is a foreigner, then he contacts the persons he has already recruited in Bosnia and Herzegovina for transport, agrees with them on the number of migrants, the place, sends them the location by mobile phone, tells them when they should meet, and at what place, for what amount and who will pay".¹⁸⁵

179 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Toolkit to Combat Smuggling of Migrants: Tool 2 – Actors and processes in the smuggling of migrants", (July 2010).

180 Interview with BOS_010_M, 19, Afghan man, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2 March 2021.

181 Majidi, N. and Danziger, R., 'Afghanistan', in McAuliffe, M. and Laczko, F. (eds.), *Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: a global review of the emerging evidence base*, International Organization for Migration, pp. 161-186, 2016.

182 France, Court of Appeals of Paris, *Dossier No. 11/05649*, UNODC Case No. FRAh024, 5 April 2012. Available at UNODC SHERLOC Case Law Database.

183 Fabrizio Costantino and Andrea Di Nicola, "Entrepreneurial elements of human smuggling rings: findings from a multiple case study", *Trends in Organized Crime* (August 2020).

184 FATF, op. cit. (July 2022).

185 Interview with BOS_05_KII, prosecutors, interviewed by UNODC, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 April 2021.



KEY FINDINGS RELATING TO VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS

Key Finding 15

High-level organizers of smuggling and trafficking may be based anywhere – in the countries of origin, transit, or destination of their clients, or in other countries. They may manage the illicit income, costs, and proceeds remotely, through wire or banking institution transfers, informal money transfer systems or delivery by cash courier.

Key Finding 16

In the case of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons from GLO.ACT partner countries, IFFs consist of value transfers using cash, the hawala system, and, to a lesser extent, money transfer service providers. This poses challenges for the response to IFFs related to smuggling and trafficking, as the majority of cases involve payment and transfer methods that are not so easily traceable.

CHAPTER 5

IFFs associated with Proceeds of TIP and SOM

Information on what traffickers and smugglers do with their profits is rather limited, yet there are some indications of how money is moved. For example, perpetrators may deposit money in banks using a common mobile phone number, address, and accounts in different names. They also frequently transfer money to “risk” countries and have unusual withdrawals, deposits, or wire activity inconsistent with normal business practices, or dramatic and unexplained changes in account activity, among others.¹⁸⁶

Criminal organizations may use cash payments to purchase appreciating assets domestically or abroad, such as real estate and luxury goods, investments in the financial sector and/or investments in other illegal activities, such as drug and firearms trafficking.¹⁸⁷ Little of the evidence gathered and analysed suggests that traffickers and smugglers operating physically in GLO.ACT partner countries participate in any asset investment, which may be due to the methodological limitations of the research. Nevertheless, asset investment is generally employed by high-level perpetrators organizing operations from a third country. Outward IFFs emerge when illicit funds are transferred abroad (e.g., to import goods and services or to buy foreign financial or non-financial assets).

Based on key informant interviews conducted for this research, in order to launder proceeds, perpetrators in Europe tend to use cash-intensive businesses,

such as money service businesses (MSBs), real estate and high-value goods. Smugglers and traffickers from GLO.ACT partner countries operating in Europe use illicit income in three main ways, each of which generates IFFs:

1. Money is sent back to the country of origin, where it is often invested in legal businesses such as restaurants and bars, or real estate;
2. The money is used to support a lavish lifestyle, generating IFFs related to consumer goods; or
3. It is (re-)invested in other criminal or legitimate activities in the destination country.¹⁸⁸

There are reports of cash payments earned through trafficking in and from Afghanistan that are deposited in and laundered through poorly regulated financial institutions throughout the world, notably, Western European and Middle Eastern banking systems.¹⁸⁹ Some IFFs are directed inwards to Afghanistan, though this phenomenon is particularly difficult to track.¹⁹⁰

In an interview conducted by UNODC for this Study, an Iraqi law enforcement officer pointed out that it was not uncommon for traffickers to invest profits from exploiting victims in cash purchases of cafés, roulette and gambling rooms, spas and night-clubs. Depositing the profits in banks is far less common in Iraq due to poor banking systems.¹⁹¹

KEY FINDING RELATING TO CRIME PROCEEDS

Key Finding 17

Smugglers and traffickers use criminal proceeds in three ways: (i) sent back to the country of origin, often invested in legal businesses such as restaurants and bars, or real estate; (ii) used to support a lavish lifestyle, generating IFFs related to consumer goods; or (iii) invested in other criminal or legitimate activities in the destination country. Each of these ways may generate IFFs and often involve some form of money laundering.

186 Financial Action Task Force, *Money Laundering Risks Arising from Trafficking in Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants*, (Paris, FATF Secretariat, 2011).

187 Fabrizio Costantino and Andrea Di Nicola, “Entrepreneurial elements of human smuggling rings: findings from a multiple case study”, *Trends in Organized Crime* (August 2020).

188 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Leveraging Anti-Money Laundering Regimes to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings*, (Vienna, OSCE, 2014).

189 Harris Samad and Fatima Salman, *Strategies for Reforming Afghanistan's Illicit Networks* (Atlantic Council South Asia Center, 2020), p. 2.

190 Ibid.

191 Interview with IRA_030_KII, law enforcement official, interviewed by UNODC, in Iraq (virtually), 11 March 2021.

CHAPTER 6

Policy Recommendations

6.1. Illicit Financial Flows associated with Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons

1. Efforts to address illicit financial flows should not compromise the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and those who are driven to leave their countries due to other circumstances that threaten their fundamental human rights. National responses to illicit financial flows arising from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants must adopt a human rights-based and gender-sensitive approach, in full respect of the range of rights that are guaranteed under international law.
2. International cooperation efforts must include cooperation between partner countries, transit, and destination countries, and relevant third countries. As this Study shows, organizers of smuggling operations may be based in third countries, rather than in origin, transit or destination countries, which in some cases can be far away from the smuggling routes. Thus, investigations of IFFs flowing into and out of origin, transit, destination and third countries need to be undertaken proactively. For this to happen, international cooperation between origin, transit, destination, and third countries, including through joint or parallel financial investigations, needs to be fostered. Cooperation must also be multi-sectoral in nature, involving law enforcement agencies, financial investigation entities, other criminal justice agencies, and private sector actors, who are crucial in tracking suspicious transactions. As discussed in the Study, there is potentially a lot of diffusion of earnings from organizers in third countries to their members on the ground in origin, transit, and destination countries. Increased cooperation with third countries in a multi-sectoral way is key in tracing these transactions.
3. There is a need to strengthen the legislative framework required to address illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. National legislation should specifically define and criminalize participation in an organized criminal group. This legislation must also impose tougher penalties for organized crime involvement in trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling should be included as predicate offences under money laundering criminal provisions, and such provisions must enable both seizure of assets used to commit these offences and confiscation of proceeds of the crime. Fundamentally, in countries where smuggling of migrants is not specifically criminalized, it is essential to do so, by ratifying and domestically implementing the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
4. There is a need to enhance criminal justice actors' understanding of how digital tools and services are being used for the facilitation of criminal activities online, including trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. As with any industry, the use of social media and other digital tools and services is now an integral and organic part of criminal activities in the online sphere. There is a wide range of web- and mobile-based tools and services currently being used. These include platforms for social networks, content sharing and instant communication; digital applications for navigation, encryption, locking and erasing contents on a device; digital services that enable money transfers and money laundering; digital solutions for cryptocurrency transfers; and use of the darkweb.¹⁹² Vigilant intelligence gathering on the developments and trends of such technology in IFFs, including open-source intelligence (OSINT), is an essential measure for the effective investigation and prosecution of trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. Specialized training of relevant criminal justice actors, including on how to detect such online criminal activities and how to collect and preserve electronic evidence, is also crucial.

192 Frontex and Europol, "Digitalisation of migrant smuggling: Digital tools and apps enabling facilitation" (September 2021), p. 22.

6.2. Smuggling of Migrants

5. Organized criminal groups, including those involved in trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, routinely use corporations, businesses, charitable organizations or other legal entities to carry out their crimes. Ensuring that such legal persons cannot be used to shield natural persons from liability, and that their complex structures cannot be used to conceal their illegal activities and its illicit financial flows, is an important component of combatting transnational organized crime. In accordance with Article 10 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), liability of legal persons must be established by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have committed the offences.
6. Preventive measures (e.g., expanding income generation opportunities) must be scaled up in communities, especially near migrant smuggling hotspots in both origin and transit countries. The emergence of opportunistic smugglers can be attributed to, inter alia, a lack of alternative livelihoods.
7. International cooperation, including by prioritizing the investigation of IFFs, must also be scaled up between origin, transit, and destination countries along the known and frequently used routes, in particular the Western Balkans and Central Mediterranean routes. As indicated in the Study, these are the most frequently used routes for smuggling of migrants, and are thus highly lucrative for smugglers. Cooperation should include proactive, intelligence-driven investigations targeting loosely connected and less hierarchical providers of smuggling services that are based in known hubs.

6.3. Trafficking in Persons

8. When investigating cases involving trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, national authorities should be trained in identifying the indicators in the scenarios, modalities and types of actors that are known to generate higher levels of illicit income to better detect and investigate the corresponding illicit financial flows.
9. The South Asia subregion convicts fewer perpetrators of trafficking in persons in proportion to its overall population than most other regions. There is thus a need to increase the investigation and prosecution of internal trafficking cases in the region as well as to better identify and protect victims of internal trafficking. Although internal trafficking is less likely to result in illicit financial flows than cross-border trafficking, action against domestic trafficking is a necessary component to tackling illicit financial flows. Lack of robust national responses to internal trafficking can lead to unchecked proliferation of such crimes and fuel the expansion of organized criminal groups and trafficking networks. In the case of internal labour trafficking for the production of goods and merchandise sold internationally, it may in fact result in significant illicit financial flows.
10. There is a need to strengthen law enforcement capacity to identify, investigate and prosecute illicit financial flows and the transfers of money behind trafficking in persons. This can be achieved by prioritizing financial investigations, strengthening anti-money laundering provisions and enabling the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of the crime as well as asset recovery mechanisms. Financial investigations are an essential component of the fight against trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling as they provide evidence of the offence, deprive the trafficker or smuggler of his/her financial motivation, and allow direct and indirect compensation for victims. According to available statistics, seizures and confiscation of assets are low despite the UNTOC provisions stipulating that proceeds of crime or property must be confiscated and can be used to compensate the victims.

11. Special attention, especially from a gender perspective, must be given to strengthening the understanding of and responses to illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation and labour exploitation. The gendered nature of trafficking in persons is evident through data collection. The UNODC Global Reports on Trafficking in Persons, which have collected and analysed global trafficking data since 2003, have consistently found that women and girls make up the majority of detected victims. An analysis of court cases shows that female victims are subjected to physical or extreme violence at the hands of their traffickers at a rate three times higher than males.¹⁹³ Furthermore, income from labour exploitation, and therefore also illicit financial flows, is often shrouded in legitimacy. There is a need for more research and investigation to be able to quantify these flows and devise appropriate responses in the partner countries.

6.4. Value Transfer Systems and Illicit Income

12. During the data collection process for the Study, it was clear that investigations of trafficking cases generally do not include financial investigations in practice. Yet, this is the crucial kind of evidence that would improve the quality of investigations. It ensures the apprehension of not just the low-level actors, but also the organizers who make the most profit out of the offence. Countries should:
- Provide specialized training for relevant actors (e.g., police, investigators, prosecutors, judges) on illicit financial flows;
 - Adapt legislation to establish or strengthen asset management and recovery agency, compensation funds, and databases and coordination among such units through action plans, strategies, and standard operating procedures;
 - Improve international cooperation through parallel or joint investigations and joint asset recovery mechanisms to confiscate proceeds and assets; and
 - Strengthen cooperation with the private sector.
13. Effective monitoring and investigative mechanisms must be put in place to identify, monitor, and take action against the criminal abuse of hawala and other cash-based traditional value transfer systems. In particular, criminal justice institutions must strengthen their understanding and expertise in addressing the way in which the abovementioned value transfer systems move illicit gains from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. However, any measures taken should not penalize the legitimate use of these systems, particularly as hawala is an established way of doing business in many partner countries.
14. There is a need for closer cooperation between governments and the private sector, especially value transfer service providers, to track illicit financial flows from trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. This may entail enactment of an enabling legal provision or establishment of a framework for such cooperation, and/or in practice, designation of focal points to facilitate mutual sharing of information. Money service businesses and social media platforms have an important role to play in detecting and tracking illicit financial flows. Awareness raising initiatives and training for the private and public sector stakeholders should also take place, including on the financial disruption, transnational cash-courier networks, open-source intelligence (OSINT) and red flag indicators of trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants.

¹⁹³ UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2022* (United Nations publication, Sales no.: E.23.IV.1), p. 18.

Annexes

Annex 1. UNODC SHERLOC Database Cases Considered

UNODC Case Number	Name	Country	Year
LUXx001	The Court of Appeal of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (La Cour d'appel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg), Arrêt N° 34/19 X	Luxembourg	2019
MKD011	The Basic Court in Skopje, Kok. no. 113/15	North Macedonia	2016
SRBx009	The Basic Court in Subotica, 2 K. 592/16	Serbia	2016
SRBx014	Appeal Court in Niš, 18Kžm1.No. 21/16	Serbia	2016
SRBx016	Higher Court of Vranje, Km. No. 25/16	Serbia	2016
ESPh048	Provincial Court of Lleida (Audiencia Provincial de Lleida), Resolución 59/2015	Spain	2015
SRBx008	The Basic Court of Zaječar, 2K 175/15	Serbia	2015
SRBx013	Court of Appeal in Belgrade, Kž1 836/15	Serbia	2015
AUTx009	Regional Court for Wiener Neustadt (Landesgericht), Servitenkloster Smuggling Case	Austria	2014
ITAh007	Court of Catania (Tribunale di Catania), Appeal against order of precautionary detention, Proc. n. 2022/2014 R.I.M.C.	Italy	2014
SRBx007	Basic Court of Subotica, 1 K 852/2012	Serbia	2013
UKh013	Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R. v K.P.M. et al., EWCA Crim 1372	United Kingdom	2013
AUTx005	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2012 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	Austria	2012
AUTx010	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2012 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	Austria	2012
AUTx011	Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) (OGH), 140s91/12g (OGH, 25 September 2012)	Austria	2012
AUTx014	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2011 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	Austria	2012

UNODC Case Number	Name	Country	Year
FRAh024	Court of Appeals of Paris, Dossier No. 11/05649	France	2012
UKh006	Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R. v S.J., EWCA Crim 2565	United Kingdom	2012
UKh011	Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), A.R.S. v Regina, EWCA Crim 2669	United Kingdom	2012
AUTx006	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2011 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht) – Operation Sofia	Austria	2011
AUTx012	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2011 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht) – Operation Palu’	Austria	2011
GEOx001	Tbilisi City Court, Georgia v NE, RG, AG, ZE, KG	Georgia	2010
GRCx035	The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 454/2009	Greece	2010
GRCx038	The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 1615/2010	Greece	2010
UKh007	Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), A.M. and Others v The Queen, EWCA Crim 2400	United Kingdom	2010
MLT005	Court of Magistrates (Criminal Judicature), The Police v A.R.F (Ref 315/2009)	Malta	2009
AUTx059	Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) (OGH), 110s122/07m (OGH, 1 April 2008)	Austria	2008
GBRx033	Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), R v Kashyap, EWCA Crim 775	United Kingdom	2008
GRCx024	The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 2278/2008	Greece	2008
GRCx037	The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 1025/2008	Greece	2008
AUTx037	Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2006 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	Austria	2006

UNODC Case Number	Name	Country	Year
AUTx060	Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) (OGH), 120s111/06z (OGH, 10 November 2006)	Austria	2006
GBRx035	Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R v Tipu & Bari, EWCA Crim 1859	United Kingdom	2006

Annex 2. Cost Components Collected

2.1. Movement Costs Based on Interviews¹⁹⁶

Profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Afghan male, 18	Afghanistan-Türkiye	\$2,260
Afghan male, 18	Türkiye-Serbia	\$1,695
Afghan male, 19	Afghanistan-Islamic Republic of Iran	\$1,130
Afghan male, 19	Islamic Republic of Iran-Türkiye	\$700
Afghan male, 19	Türkiye-Serbia	\$3,000
Afghan male, 19	Türkiye-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€2,000
Afghan male, 24	Logar province (Afghanistan)-Istanbul (Türkiye)	\$2,034
Afghan male, 24	Türkiye-Greece	\$3,164
Afghan male, 24	Türkiye-Athens (Greece)	\$1,582
Afghan male, 24	Athens (Greece)-Serbia	\$622
Afghan male, 26	Kabul (Afghanistan)-Tehran (I. R Iran)	\$1,695
Afghan male, 26	Türkiye-Belgrade (Serbia)	\$3,390
Afghan male, 27	Islamic Republic of Iran-Türkiye	\$3,390
Afghan male, 27	Türkiye-Greece by boat	\$1,356
Afghan male, 29	Türkiye-Greece	\$2,147
Afghan male, 29	Greece-Serbia	\$1,000
Afghan male, 30	Afghanistan- Bosnia and Herzegovina	€10,000
Aid workers	Iraq-Europe via Türkiye	\$3,000

¹⁹⁶ Information based on interviews conducted for this study and other available sources.

Profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Aid workers	Iraq-Türkiye	\$1,000
Aid workers	Türkiye-Europe	\$8,000
Iranian female, 35	Greece-North Macedonia	\$2,825
Iranian male, 28	Islamic Republic of Iran-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€13,000-€15,000
Iranian male, 29	Türkiye-Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	\$2,260
Iranian male, 29	Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$678
Iranian male, 30	Islamic Republic of Iran-Türkiye	\$1,130
Iranian male, 30	Islamic Republic of Iran-Bosnia and Herzegovina by air	€2,000-€3,000
Iranian male, 31	Türkiye-Greece	€1,050
Iranian male, 31	Albania-Serbia	€300
Iranian male, 31	Serbia-Bosnia (to cross river)	€50
Iranian male, 33	Islamic Republic of Iran-Türkiye	\$3,390
Iranian male, 33	Türkiye-Bulgaria	\$8,475
Iranian male, 33	Bulgaria-Serbia	\$7,910
Iranian male, 38	Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$565
Iranian male, 43	Türkiye-Greece	€1,800
Iraqi female, 41	Türkiye-Denmark	\$9,000
Iraqi female, 42	Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€100
Iraqi male, 19	Türkiye-Greece (including room, food)	\$1,130
Iraqi male, 19	Greece-Albania	\$170
Iraqi male, 22	Türkiye-Samos (Greece)	\$565
Iraqi male, 22	Izmir (Türkiye)-Thessaloniki (Greece)	\$1,130

Profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Iraqi male, 22	Greece-Montenegro via Albania (including room)	\$565
Iraqi male, 24	Izmir (Türkiye)-Greece by plastic boat	\$800
Iraqi male, 24	Serbia-Hungary by land	\$1,500
Iraqi male, 25	Istanbul (Türkiye)-Izmir (Türkiye)	€1,000
Iraqi male, 26	Izmir (Türkiye)-Greece by plastic boat	€2,000
Iraqi male, 27	Italy-Germany by land	\$1,000
Iraqi male, 30	Türkiye-Kos (Greece)	\$1,582
Iraqi male, 30	Türkiye-Lesbos (Greece)	\$1,469
Iraqi male, 44	Türkiye-Greece	\$5,000 (for 2 people)
Iraqi male, 44	Greece-Bosnia and Herzegovina (food, taxi, clothing included)	\$1,000 (for 2 people)
Iraqi male, 48	Türkiye-Greece	\$3,955
Pakistani female, 25	Türkiye-Greece	\$2,260
Pakistani female, 25	Greece-North Macedonia	\$1,356/ 2 adults, \$452 for baby
Pakistani female, 25	Serbia-Austria	\$6,780/ 3 people
Pakistani female, 25	North Macedonia-Serbia	\$565
Pakistani male, 29	Pakistan-Türkiye	€2,000
Pakistani male, 29	Türkiye-Greece	€2,500
Pakistani male, 30	Pakistan-Türkiye	\$1,200
Pakistani male, 30	Türkiye-Greece	\$1,695
Pakistani male, 30	Greece-Serbia	\$1,921
Pakistani male, 30	Pakistan-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€5,000
Pakistani male, 30	Pakistan-Türkiye	€1,400

Profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Pakistani male, 30	Türkiye-Bulgaria	€3,000
Pakistani male, 30	Bulgaria-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€2,000
Pakistani male, 31	Türkiye-Serbia	\$3,729
Pakistani male, 43	Greece-Albania	€70
Pakistani male, 43	Albania-Kosovo	€50
Prosecutor	Pakistan-EU countries	€15,000
Prosecutor	Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€1,500
Prosecutor	Within Bosnia and Herzegovina	€150-200 (per car, or €50 for one person)
Prosecutors	Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina)-Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)-Bihac (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	€50-€100 (fewer people=more expensive)
Prosecutors	Serbia-Bosnia and Herzegovina	€150-€300 (fewer people=more expensive)
Prosecutors	Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina)-Bihac (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	€150
Prosecutors	Croatian border-Zagreb (Croatia)	€50-€150 (fewer people=more expensive)
Senior Inspector	Türkiye-France, Italy, Germany or United Kingdom	€6,000
Syrian male, 24	Istanbul (Türkiye)-Greece by land	\$565
Syrian male, 26	Türkiye-Greece via Maritsa/Meriç/Evros River by inflatable boat	\$339
Syrian male, 26	Greece-Albania	\$452
Syrian male, 26	Skhoder (Albania)-Podgorica (Montenegro)	\$283
Syrian male, 26	Türkiye-Greece	\$4,181
Syrian male, 26	Italy-Denmark	\$6,000
Syrian male, 34	Türkiye-Greece	\$1,700

Profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Syrian male, 39	Türkiye-Greece	\$3,500
Syrian male, 45	Egypt-Italy by sea	\$3,500
Syrian male, 45	Italy-Denmark by land	\$4,300

2.2. Other Costs Based on Interviews

Migrant profile	Fraudulent documents	Accommodation
Afghan male, 41	Visa for Türkiye: \$2,800/adult, \$1,400/child Visa for Bulgaria: \$9,000 Visa for Serbia: \$6,800	
Iranian male, 33	EU passport of unspecified country: \$6,800	
Iranian male, 34	Identification card: \$220 2 French passports: \$1,700	
Iraqi female, 41	Work authorization for Greece: 2,500 lira	
Iraqi male, 22	Visa for Türkiye: \$1,130 Egyptian passport: \$1,130 Spanish passport: \$900	
Pakistani male, 30	Fraudulent passport plus airline ticket: \$4,000	
Prosecutors		One night in BiH: €50-€100 (fewer migrants=more expensive)
Senior Inspector		Accommodation outside reception centres in BiH €50
Syrian male, 29	German passport: €7,000	

2.3. Movement Costs Based on Cases

Case	Migrant profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Court of Appeals of Paris, Dossier No. 11/05649 (2012)	93 mostly Iranian males	(see cost)	Calais (France) – United Kingdom (by lorry): €1,500 Greece-France: €3,000 Greece-Ireland: €10,000
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R. v K.P.M. et al., EWCA Crim 1372 (2013)	1 Iranian male, 1 Iranian female	I.R. Iran-Thailand-Tanzania-Kenya-Spain-United Kingdom (by air)	\$35,000 (total for two)
The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 1615/2010	30 Pakistanis	Türkiye (via Evros River)-Greece-another EU destination (by bus)	\$8,000 (each)
Regional Court for Wiener Neustadt (Landesgericht), Servitenkloster Smuggling Case	278 mostly Pakistanis	Pakistan-Austria	€6,500-€10,000 (each)* *Group generated a total sum of €3 million
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), A.M. and Others v The Queen, EWCA Crim 2400	1 Iranian male	I.R. Iran-Athens (Greece) (by lorry)-United Kingdom (by air)	€7,000-€8,000
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R. v S.J., EWCA Crim 2565	1 Iranian male	Türkiye-Greece-Italy-United Kingdom	€1,200
Higher Court of Vranje, Km. No. 25/16	10 Iraqis, Libyans and Somalis	North Macedonia-Serbia (by foot)	€20 (each)
Austria, Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2006 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	900 Bangladeshis	Bangladesh-UAE-Ukraine-Russia-Czech Republic or Slovakia	€8,500-€11,000 (each)
Court of Catania (Tribunale di Catania), Appeal against order of precautionary detention, Proc. n. 2022/2014 R.I.M.C.	323 Syrians, Asians and Africans	Istanbul (Türkiye)-Beirut (Lebanon)-Cyprus-Alessandria (Egypt)-Italy	€6,000-€6,500 (each)

Case	Migrant profile	Journey route and mode (if known)	Cost
Tbilisi City Court, Georgia v NE, RG, AG, ZE, KG	13 Bangladeshis	Tbilisi (Georgia)- Kobuleti (Georgia) (by car)	GEL 130 (\$41)
Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2011 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht) – Operation Palu'	Turkish, Iranians, Iraqis, Syrians	Türkiye-Western Balkans-Hungary-Austria-Other EU countries	€3,000-€5,000
Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH) (Supreme Court), 110s122/07m (OGH, 1 April 2008)	Over 51 Bangladeshis, Indians and Pakistanis	Slovakia-Vienna (Austria)	€700
Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2012 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	15 Afghans	Greece-North Macedonia-Serbia-Hungary-Austria (by van)	Up to \$5,000 (each)
The Supreme Civil and Criminal Court of Greece (Aeios Pagos), Areios Pagos 454/2009	47 Somalis, 21 Palestinians, 11 Mauritians, 4 Iraqis, 3 Iranians, 2 Afghans and 1 Bangladeshi	Türkiye (via Evros River)-Greece	€1,000
Court of Magistrates (Criminal Judicature), The Police v A.R.F (Ref 315/2009)	32 Iranians	Iran-Tunis (Tunisia)-Malta (by air)	€3,000 (each)
The Basic Court in Skopje, Kok. no. 113/15	60 Afghans, Pakistanis, Sudanese, Somalis and others	Within North Macedonia	€140-€160 (per vehicle)
The Basic Court in Subotica, 2 K. 592/16	10 Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian males	Belgrade, Serbia-Hungary (by public bus and foot)	€100 (each)
Court of Appeal in Belgrade, Kž1 836/15	40 Afghans, Bangladeshis, Malians, Nigerians, Pakistanis and Syrians	Leskovac (Serbia)-Subotica (Serbia) (by van)	€500
The Basic Court of Zaječar, 2K 175/15	32 Iraqis and Afghans	Within Serbia (by van)	€500
Federal Criminal Police, Annual Report of 2012 (Bundeskriminalamt Jahresbericht)	14 Afghans and Pakistanis	Hungary-Austria (by van)	€2,500

2.4. Other Costs Based on Cases

Case	Migrant profile	Fraudulent documents	Accommodation
Court of Appeals of Paris, Dossier No. 11/05649. FRAh024 (2012).	93 Iranian males	€700-€2,500 (depending on desired nationality)	
Basic Court of Subotica, 1 K 852/20212	2 Afghan males, 1 Afghan female, 1 Afghan child		€200 (4 days in Subotica)
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division), R v Tipu & Bari, EWCA Crim 1859	Bangladeshis	£5,000	
Tbilisi City Court, Georgia v NE, RG, AG, ZE, KG	13 Bangladeshis		\$200 (multiple days in Georgia)
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), R v Kashyap, EWCA Crim 775	Over 25 Indians	£10,000 (each) (UK visas)	

Annex 3. Interviews and Focus Group Discussions Conducted by UNODC

Reference	Profile	Country of Interview	Date
BOS_01_KII	Prosecutor	Bosnia and Herzegovina	16.04.2021
BOS_02_KII	Government agency official	Bosnia and Herzegovina	19.04.2021
BOS_03_KII	Government agency official	Bosnia and Herzegovina	19.04.2021
BOS_04_KII	Prosecutor	Bosnia and Herzegovina	20.04.2021
BOS_05_KII	Prosecutors	Bosnia and Herzegovina	20.04.2021
BOS_06_KII	Prosecutors	Bosnia and Herzegovina	20.04.2021
BOS_07_M	Migrant, 30, male, Afghan	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_08_M	Migrant, 30, male, Pakistani	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_09_M	Migrant, 30, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_010_M	Migrant, 19, male, Afghan	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_011_M	Migrant, 26, male, Pakistani	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_012_M	Migrant, 44, male, Iraqi	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_013_M	Migrant, 42, female, Iraqi	Bosnia and Herzegovina	02.06.2021
BOS_014_M	Migrant, 31, male, Afghan	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
BOS_015_M	Migrant, 28, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
BOS_016_M	Migrant, 29, male, Pakistani	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
BOS_017_M	Migrant, 30, male, Pakistani	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
BOS_018_M	Migrant, 43, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
BOS_019_M	Migrant, 31, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina	03.06.2021
DEN_020_M	Migrant, 45, male, Syrian	Denmark	04.02.2021
DEN_021_M	Migrant, 39, male, Syrian	Denmark	05.02.2021

Reference	Profile	Country of Interview	Date
DEN_022_M	Migrant, 41, female, Iraqi	Denmark	21.02.2021
DEN_023_M	Migrant, 30, male, Iranian	Denmark	26.02.2021
DEN_024_M	Migrant, 26, male, Iraqi	Denmark	06.03.2021
DEN_025_M	Migrant, 24, male, Iraqi	Denmark	09.03.2021
DEN_026_M	Migrant, 29, male, Syrian	Denmark	20.02.2021
DEN_027_M	Migrant, 27, male, Iraqi	Denmark	15.03.2021
DEN_028_M	Migrant, 49, male, Iraqi	Denmark	15.03.2021
DEN_029_M	Migrant, 25, male, Iraqi	Denmark	15.03.2021
IRA_030_KII	Law enforcement official	Iraq	11.03.2021
AFG_031_FGD	Government officials	Afghanistan	11.03.2021
IRA_32_KII	Nongovernmental organizations	Iraq	09.02.2021
EUR_033_KII	Europol	The Netherlands	10.3.2021
IRA_034_KII	Intergovernmental organization officials	Iraq	17.02.2021
IRA_035_FGD	Humanitarian aid workers	Iraq	16.02.2021
PAK_036_FGD	Government officials	Pakistan	23.6.2021
PAK_037_FGD	Law enforcement officials	Pakistan	24.06.2021

Annex 4. Interviews Conducted in 2018-2019 by UNODC for MACRO Considered

Reference	Profile	Country of Interview
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-11-11	Migrant, 34, male, Syrian	Montenegro
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-03-03	Migrant, 22, male, Iraqi	Montenegro
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-15-15	Migrant, 26, male, Syrian	Montenegro
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-06-06	Migrant, 22, male, Iraqi	Montenegro
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-09-09	Migrant, 24, male, Syrian	Montenegro
MACRO – MN-01-11-S-10-10	Migrant, 26, male, Syrian	Montenegro
MACRO – S-01-11-S-16-13	Migrant, 33, male, Iranian	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-09-06	Migrant, 26, male, Syrian	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-08-05	Migrant, 48, male, Iraqi	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-11-8	Migrant, 19, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-25-22	Migrant, 29, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-01-11-S-20-17	Migrant, 25, female, Pakistani	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-23-20	Migrant, 26, male, Iraqi	Serbia
MACRO – S-01-11-S-01-01	Migrant, 27, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-01-11-S-17-14	Migrant, 35, female, Iranian	Serbia
MACRO – S-01-11-S-15-12	Migrant, 41, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-01-11-S-19-16	Migrant, 26, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-24-21	Migrant, 31, male, Pakistani	Serbia
MACRO – S-02-11-S-26-23	Migrant, 18, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – S-04-11-S-34-31	Migrant, 30, male, Iranian	Serbia
MACRO – S-04-11-S-35-32	Migrant, 30, male, Pakistani	Serbia

Reference	Profile	Country of Interview
MACRO – S-02-11-S-27-24	Migrant, 30, male, Iraqi	Serbia
MACRO – S-03-11-S-29-26	Migrant, 24, male, Afghan	Serbia
MACRO – A-02-10-R-01-01	Migrant, 19, male, Iraqi	Albania
MACRO – A-02-10-R-07-07	Migrant, 34, male, Iranian	Albania
MACRO – BH-1-11-S-04-04	Migrant, 30, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina
MACRO – BH-1-11-S-13-13	Migrant, 38, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina
MACRO – BH-1-11-S-16-16	Migrant, 29, male, Iranian	Bosnia and Herzegovina



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